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Actual outcomes  are compared  with projected  or targeted  out-
comes for selected  macroeconomic  variables  to assess  the  qual-
ity and relevance  of projections  in policy  framework  papers for
the Africa region.
i?olicy  Research Working Paper diaseminatethe findings of work in progress and encoumge the exchange of ideas among Bank staff and
all of  nrs  interested in development issues. Thesepapers, distributed by the Research Advisory  Staff,cary  heunamesofthe authors,reflect
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This paper  -a  product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Africa Regional Offlce  -is  part of a larger
effort to assess the progress of adjusting countries in the Africa region with macroeconomic and structural
reforms. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC
23433. Please contact Nandita Ttnnan, room J5-101, extension 34581 (August 1993, 109 pages).
Policy framework paper  (PFPs) have become  The quality and realism of PFP projections
Important documents because they provide a  are likely to Improve, says Faruqee, if certain
framework for the economic policies that a  steps are taken in making projections:
country will pursue and for donor assistance. The
projections included in these documents reflect  *  All PFPs after the first one should contain a
the policy targets and the expected outcomes of  review of outcomes in relation to projections in
policy reforms.  previous PFPs.
Faruqee focuses on the qaality and relevance  * Whenever the chances of failing short of
of these projections, comparing actual outcomes  projec'ou or targeted outcomes are high, the PFP
with the projected or targeted outcomes for  should say so.
selected variables. The Idea is that a retrospec-
tive survey such as this will eventually Improve  *  Using references such as this review, the
projections.  projections could consider benchmark figures
based on experience with successful cases of
Faruqee recommends further country-by-  adjustment.
country analysis of PFP projections and actual
outcomes to identify how much of the diver-  *  From time to time, each country department
gence between the two is due to external iactors  could carry out a review to assess the realism of
(such as weath.T and terms of trade) and how  departmental PFP projections, and the Chief
much to lack of progress in policy reform.  Economist's Office could review projections to
Delayed progress could be due to unforeseen  assess their quality.
circumstances (such as political changes or
internal strife) or to unrealistic targets.
The  PoHicyResearchWorking  PaperSeriesdisseminates  the findings  of workunder  way  in  the Banlc  An objectiveof  the  series
is to get these findings  out quickly,  even if presentations  are less than fully polished.  The findings, interpretations,  and
conclusions  in these  papers do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
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PFPs have  become  important  documents  because  they  provide  a framework  for
the economic  policies  that  a borrowing  country  will pursue  and for donor  assistance.
The projections  included  in these  documents  reflect  the policy  targets  and expected
outcomes  of policy  reforms. The quplity  and relevance  of these  projections  are the
subject  matter  of this paper, which  compares  actual  outcomes  with the projected  or
targeted  outcomes  for selected  variables. It is hoped  that such  a retrospective  survey
would  help  us to improve  the projections  in the PFPs.
This paper is intended  to be a usefil reference  for the Regional  staff working
with PFP projections.
An earEer  version  of the paper  was discussed  with some  staff members  and
this version  takes  into account  the comments  and suggestions  received  on the earlier
version.
R. Faruqee1
MACROECONOMIC  PROJECTIONS  IN POLICY FRAMEWORK  PAPERS
IN THE  AFRICA  REGION
I.  Introduction  and General  Issues
A policy framework  paper (PFP) is a requirement  for access to the lMP's
Structural  Adjustmnent  Facility  (SAP)  and Extended  Adjustment  Facility  (ESAF). The
Policy  Framework  Paper (PFP)  process  was  introduced  in 1985  to ensure  that  the Bank,
the IMP and the recipient  gov  -nme-nts  all operate  within  the s'ame  macroeconomic  and
policy framework. A PFP provides  "the broad outline  of medium-term  programs  to
overcome  balance  of payments  problems  and foster growth. In their final  form, PFPs
are statements  by governments  of their economic  adjustment  and development  policies,
plans, and  objectives  over  a rolling  three  year  period (with  annual  updates),  and provide
a framework  within  which  macroeconomic  and structural  problems  can be assessed".j/
As of November 1992, 102 PFPs have been prepared in the Africa region for 29
countries  with SAF and ESAP  programs. Over the years, the PFPs have become  an
important  document  on which  the Bank  staff, the IMF staff and  the policy  makers  of the
borrowing  country  spend  considexmble  time.
Have  the PFPs actually  served  the purpose  for which  they  are intended?  Indeed,
it is necessary  to carefully examine  whether these documents  have given adequate
1/ Operational  Directive  2.202
attention  to all three aspects  of adjustment  - stabilization  policies,  structural  adjustment
policies  and sectoral  reforms. Another  important  question  that  needs  to be answered  is
whether  the PFPs have been fully interaied  by the policy makers  in the borrowing
country.
A major issue in evaluating  PFPs has been the relative  weight  attached  to the
IMW's  macroeconomic  concems  versus the more *developmental"  concerns  of the
Bank. The fist part of a PPP sets  forth quantitative  macroeconomic  objectives  for GDP
growth, inflation  and the balance  of payments. This survey  of African  PFPs indicate
geater Bank  influence  in later PFPs than  in earlier  ones  - evident  from more  exposition
of sectoral  issues  and more  emphasis  on poverty  alleviation  objectives  in later  PFPs than
in earlier ones  - evident  from more  exposition  of sectoral  issues  and more  emphasis  on
poverty  alleviation  objectives  in later PFPs compared  to the earlier ones.
The second  part of a PFP describes  a sere  of policy measures  deipned to
address  strucural adjustment  issues. Across  tie entire  range  of policies  that  a PFP can
contain, an analysis of the content of first year PFPs revealed  that all contain the
standard macroeconomic  policy prescriptions  (monetary  control, deficit reduction,
exchange  rate policy  and debt management).  These macroeconomic  poliies  form an
identifiable  'core program' that has retained this preeminence also in later PFPs.
However,  sectoral  policies  have  grown  in importance  again  indicating  tie increased  role
of the Bank  in later PFPs.3
The relevance  of primarily  pursuing  a "cure program"  of policies  in the PFP
countries  has been  questioned.  The application  of this  program  reflects  a diagnosis  that
the countries  are only suffering  from a common  set of macroeconomic  problems  when
in fact they could be suffering  from a different  set of development  problems  iPz  most
cases, although  displaying  similar macroeconomic  problems. Long-term  development
issues include a weak human  capital endowment  and lack of entrepreneurship,  high
populauon growth, a  technologically  backward agricultural sector and  a  fragile
environment. These problems  or impediments  are in addition  to the problems  that
usually  are addressed  by PFPs, namely  overvalued  exchange  rates, poor incentives,  Irgh
lœboi  costs and a grossly  inefficient  public  enterprise  sector. And this core program
owes as much  to short run macroeconomic  considerations  (especially  deficit  reduction)
as it does to growth  concerns. While the concern  that the growth  issues still receive
comparatively  less attention in  PFPs is  sti1l justified, the  later PFPs do  show
improvement  in this regard.
On the positive side there appears  to be a consensus  that the PFP process  has
improved  the coordination  between  the Bank,  the IMF and other  donors. However,  the
time cost of achieving  this convergence  of views  has been quite high. From the point
of view of the borrowing  country, this convergence  has produced  both favorable  and
anfavorable  outcomes. While  it does  simplify  the task of dealing  wi'C!  the multi-lateral
agencies  it has led to an increase  in 'cross conditionality"  whereby  both the Bank  and
Fund must be satisfied  with the PFP before either is willing to provide financial
assistance. In addition,  the PFP has acquired  the status  of an "endorsement"  of the4
country by the Bank and Fund in the eyes of other donors, and thus has become
so iething  of a prerequisite  for purely bilateral  aid flows.
Focussing  more  closely  on the projections,  a strikin-  anomaly  in the PFPs is the
inconsistency  between  the projections  for growth and investment  rates.  A standard
growth  accounting  framework  would  lead  one to expect  that if a country  is predicted  to
undergo more rapid growth over a specified period, then ceters paribus that country
should  be expected  to have  a higher  rate  of investment  over  thaf  period. However,  there
is little comlation between  the projected  increased  in investment  and the projected
growth rates by country.  Overall, the projected  increase  in growth far exceeded  the
projected  increase  in investment.  One is therefore  left to wonder  whether  the increased
productivity  of existing  capital  and future  investment  could  be expected  to be the main
sources  of increased  growth  over the PFP period. In the short run, increased  utilization
of existing  capacity  can be the source  but in the medium  to long run this can not be the
main  source  of growth.
The primary concern  of this paper is with the realism of the supply  response
assumed  in PFPs.  In particular,  it deals with the possibility  that PFP projections  could
display  excessive  optmism about the medium  term outlook. There are a number  of
reasons  why  this might  happen. First, the issue  of government  "ownershl;' of the PFP
program  has given  rise to concern. Involvement  of the government  in PFP formulation
was very low in the initial stages. It has improved  with later PFPs but there is still a
tendency  for gove..mer.:3  to simply sign off' on a document  written  for them by the5
Bank and Fund.  This has meant that the commitment  to implementing  the measures in
the PFP has often been very poor and that the policy changes on which the projections
were based  may not in fact have  taken  place.
Second,  the  reformn process  could  be  more  sensitive  to  terms  of  trade
develo; ments than was realized when the PFP was being formulated. Adverse terms of
trade developments  could undermine the reform process and in turn undermine the basis
for the PFP projections. A recent  IMF  review  2I  documented  a strong correlation
between terms of  trade  improvements and  progress towards external balance and
sustained growth.  It  is possible that it was relatively favorable circumstances that
allowed for  successful policy refornm  rather  than policy reform  creating favorable
circumstances.  To the extent that this was not incorporated into PFPs, the projections
could thus appear excessively optimistic.
A final reason to be concerned about excessive optimism is that an analysis of the
projections in PFPs compared .4th the historical experience in a given country shows
that a substantial  improvement in various indicators was expected  to take place under the
adjustment  program. These improvements  would  have represented  a substantial  departure
from the recent experience of  the countries in  question.  The PFPs in the  sample
incorporated buoyant expectations  for growth rates, export volumes and also anticipated
significant  reductions in the rate of mnflation.  The concern is that the projections might
reflect a too radical a departure from recent behavior to be realistic.
2I 'Review  of Experience  under  ESAF-Supported  Arrangements',  February  19936
Given these  concerns,  this review  asse-es whether  the stabilization  targets  and
projected  adjustment  outcomes  during  the mediuwn-term  scuarios of the PFPs  have  been
reasonable  or whether  they reflect  excessively  optinistic  assumptions  regarding  policy
progress and supply  response  to policy  re  forms.  A related  pulpose of this paper -
partiularly relevant  for countries  where SAP a.ud  ESAF operations  of the ABF are
coming  to an end  - is to assess  whether  stabilization  targets  set out in PFPs, supportd
by SAPs  and ESAPs, were met.
This note  is organized  as follows:  Secton I presents  an overview  of the  firdings,
including  aggregated  results  for the Region. Section  m presents  aggregat-' results  by
grouping  these  countries  according  to selected  characterics  in order  to identify  whether
there is any systematic  pattern emerging from the groupings.  The final section
summarizes  the findings  of die paper  and  suggests  some  steps  that  the Regional  staff  may
take  to make  the PFP targets  and  projections  more  realistic. The note has two  annexes  -
- Annex  I presents  the picture  country  by country,  along with  country  graphs  and tables,
and  Annex  I gives  the  results  by analytical  groups  along  with relevant  graphs  and  tables.
The  paWer  compares acual  outcomes with  projected values of  selected
macroenomic variables  in PFPs  of the Africa  Reg;on. The oojective  is to throw light
on two  central  aspects  of the adjustment  programs:  (a)  how well  the stabilization  targets
as reflected  in the projections  are being met,  and (b) what has been the actual  response7
to the reforms  in comparison  to what was projected.Y The two stabiition  indicators
ued to do this are:  (a) budget  deficit  to GDP ratio and (b) current  account  balance  to
GDP ratio.  The four variables  selected  to assess actual progrs  in responding  to
reforms  are: investment  to GDP  ratio, savings  to GDP  ratio, export  growth  rate and  the
growth  rate of GDP4/. The variables  on trends  of investmnent  te,  savings  rates, and
export  growth  represents  outcomes  expected  of the reforms  in the short-  to medium-run.
The GDP growth  rAte  reflects  the overall  outcome  and will largely  be influenced  by the
performance  of investments,  savings and exports.  Box 1 below presents the exact
definition  of the variables  reviewed  and  records  the sources  of the  data  used. One  should
note here that there are often differences  among  sources  ini  the actual values of the
variables  used.  The paper however  uses the common  sources  of country  data in the
Bank.
iIt  would  be useful  to make  a distinction  between  program  targets,  particularly  with regard
to stabilization,  and projected  outcomes. If the targets  are not met, outcomes  will  not be as
projected. Since  the min focus  of this exercise  is to judge  the degree  to which  PFP targets
and projections  were in pracice met, the paper  will  not differentiate  between  the program
targets  and projected  outcomes. They  will  be treated  in the same  manner  in reviewing  the
observed  congruence  or deviation  between  the actual  and projected  values  of the selected
variables. One  should  also note  that the realization  of program  targets  and  projections  would
depend  on.  the implementation  of underlying  policies. For example,  the reduction  of a budget
deficit  would  depend  upon improved  collection  of revenue  and/or  control  of public
expenditure.  A complete  analysis  of the sources  of the discrepancy  between  targets  and actual
values  will  have  to include  a critical  look at the progress  of policies. This paper  does not get
into  the sources  of the discrepancy.
&/Of  course, other  variables  could  have  been  selected  to assess  progress  In  the implementation
of policy  reforms  and outcomes  of these  reforms. The  projected  inflation  rate, a key variable
for progress  in stabilization,  was  also examined  for countries  for which  such  projections  were
;,vailable. Similarly,  debt ratio was  also reviewed. The conclusions  reached  form the
analysis  of the variables  selected  would  generally  hold for other  variables  not included  in the
analysis.8
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The PFPs are like rolling  plans.  They are revised  on the basis of emerging
circumstances  including  the progress  of ongoing  reforms. Each PFP makes  projections,
and on occasion  the projections  of a particular  PPP for a future  year are different  from
the  projections  in earlier  PFPs  for those  years. In comparing  the  projections  and actuals,
I have  taken  the latest  projections  into account. Since  the  later  projections  often  reflected
trends  up to #hat  point, they are expected  to be closer to the actual  values than  earlier
projections.  5I
This  paper  considers  PFPs  prepared  for 21 Sub-Saharan  African  countries. Eight
coauntries  have been  excluded,  however,  from the total 51st  of countries  for which  PFPs
have  been  prepared. These  include  Somalia,  Chad  and Sierra  Leone  where  intemal  strife
or political  transition  derailed  adjustment  programs.  The other  five countries  are Burkina
Faso, Rwanda,  Equatorial  Guinea,  Sao  Tome & Piincipe,  and  Comoros  - countries  that
have had only one PFP until November  1992, the cut-off  date for PFPs included  for
analysis  in this paper.
II.  Overviiew of Results
The aggregated  picture was estimated  by comparing  the average values of
projections  and actuals  of the same  set of countries  for which  the values  were available.
(See TalMe  1).  As noted,  the key indicator  for intemal  balance  is the budget  deficit  to
GDP ratio. While  there can be different  estimates  of the budget  deficit,  this  paper uses
5I  From this point  of view, the observed  divergence  of actual  values  from projections  based
on a later PFP will be generAlly  less  than what  ouie  would  find if the projections  of an earlier
PFP were used.10
the  estimata without grant,  a  measure that  will  correctly reflect progress toward
sustainable internal balance.  Almost all adjustment programs aim at reduction of the
relative size of the budget deficit which is  key to containing effective demand and
releasing resources for the pnvate sector.  Here the projections have been somewhat
ambitious.  The average budget deficit to GDP ratio, 'or countries for which data was
available, was just about 11 percent in 1986.bi  For these countries, the average budget
deficit to GDP ratio was projected (using the latest available projection from PFPs) to
come down to 10% in 1987.  Instead, the average budget deficit to GDP ratio went up
to about 12% in that year. This implies that the expected  efforts to reduce budget deficit
did not come forth.  In other words, the commitment  of governments to reduction of
budget deficit as  assumed in  the PFP  projections, was in  fact  weak.  Either  the
commitment  of government  improved  in later years or the projections  became much more
realistic.  The aggregated record of the subsequent years also shows that generally
projected (or targeted) values for budget deficit were lower than actual outcomes, but the
difference is much smaller than earlier years.  The years  1990 and 1991 have seen
progress both in reducing budget defi^its and in getting the deficit projection closer to
the target level.  In both years, the projection exceeded  the outcome by only about 0.5%
of GDP per year, a substantial improvement on earlier years.
{/As noted,  most  budget  deficit  estimates  are without  grants. In one or two cases, as noted  in
the graph, the data on budget  deficit  without  grants are not available. There  I have  used
grant-inclusive  data. The awegate figures  reflect  unweighted  averages. However,  in the
case  of budget  deficit,  there are two small  countries  (Rwanda  and Lesotho)  where  the
deviations  between  projected  and actual  values  are unusually  high. Since  inclusion  in the
aggregate  measure  will  distort  the picture,  they  have  been  excluded  from estimating  the
aggregated  simple  average  measure. It should  also be noted  that  the figures  for the budget
deficit  for Guinea-Bissau  are not comparable  between  successive  PFPs. I used  the current
budget  deficit  from the 1989  PFP.11
TABLE  1: Sumary Tabl for Couctri. R.vlwad
(Unwe_ghted  AvecWa  hr 21 Coied.)
1986  1987  198  1989  1990  1991
al  Pated_  Acta  Projected  ActI  Proetd  Acta  Projee  al  Projted  Ad"
Budse  -10.8  -9.9  -11.8  4.  413  3.5  -11.5  43  4.  -7.6  -7.9
D.  _
Currem  -14.6  -14.6  -153  -11.6  -14.9  -15.2  -16.0  -16.1  -16.4  .15.6  -16.6
Account
Deficit
(cmT  (-15.0)  (-14.9)  (-15.2)  (-143)  (-14.1)  (-13.9)
Adjuetd
Acuala)III
invatoet  1S.5  16.6  17.5  18.10  17.9  16.9  17.3  17.4  17.6  17.7  16.4
S&VIOg  6.8  63  5.6  7.0  5.5  7.0  4.9  6.7  4.3  6.4  3.4
Export  2.7  6.9  4.7  43  1.5  7.8  2.6  6.7  7.3  93  -0.1
Growth
aDp  3.1  2.9  2.2  3.8  4.9  4.0  3.2  3.7  2.1  3.4  2.
As for external  balance,  the  acul  value  of the curmt account  deficit  as a rato
of GDP  has  also  exceeded  the  proected figures  in all the years. There  are two  aspects
of the expectd impact  of adjustmnent  programs  on this ratio - the compression  of
demand  allowing  imports  to go down,  and improved  pnce incentives  for ceprtu to go
up, reducing  the current  account  balance. I shall  come  back  to the  growth  of exports
while  discusng supply  responses.  The  slow  pace  of externa sctor adjustment  reflects
a continued  reiance on the flow of extrnal resource.  Even  the proected values
assumed  that  these  countres  would  continue  to have  on  average  14  to 15  prroent  cunrent
account  gap. In fact, snce the projections  are based  on the latest  PFP available,  the
projected  values indicate  the acceptance of the fact that the  gap would continue to be
large. Whereas  the  gap on  average  was  projected  to come  down  to lower  than  12  percent12
in 1988, by 1991, the gap was expected to be over 15 percent.  Aithough the actual gap
has been larger than what was projected, the later projections reflect an expectation of
a continued significant  gap in the current account balance of SSA countries.
Why is the current account gap not narrowing?  Part of the answer lies in the
movement  of the real effective  exchange rate.  The countries that managed to depreciate
the real exchange rate were able to narrow their current account deficits.  Deteioration
in the terms of  trade also contributes significantly to  the gap.  Most SSA countries
suffered terms of trade setbacks. When the actual current account balance estimates are
corrected for the terms of trade effect, the relative size of the deficit is smaller than the
projected  values.  The terms-of-trade adjusted  actual figures reflect even less deficit than
projected values for recent years.  This means that if there were no change in the terms
of trade, the projected gap in current account would be quite close to the actual outcome.
However, to the extent that some part of the movement in the terms of  trade was
predictable, the projections could have reflected it.27/
Growth in  the medium- to  long-run GDP depends on investment and  saving
trends.  Stabilization and  structural  reforms  should inurease  the  profitability  of
investments  in certain sectors (such as tadables) where prices would be higher as a result
2/Another  stabilization  measure  on which  the record  is discouraging  is the rate of inflation.
The  projected  values  aiso consistently  reflect  the  objective  of bringing  down  inflation  steadily.
However,  since  policies  have  generally  failed  to reduce  the budget  deficit,  the inflation  rate
has remained  high and the  projected  decline  proved  generally  elusive. The average  inflation
rate of a PFP country,  for which  information  is available,  was 16.4%  in 1987  and the
programs  aimed  at bringing  it down  to an average  rate of 9.9% by 1988. But the actual
inflation  rate in 1988  was 14.2%. The record  has been  similar  in other years. Thus inflation
has turned  out to be a tougher  problem  than  the PFPs  projected  it to be.13
of reforms. As  a result,  the investment  rate  is expected  to increase. This increase  may,
however,  come  after  a 'pause', according  to the  latest  Bank-wide  Review  of Adjustment
Lending  (RAL  IH), because  adjustment  programs  in the short-run  may have  a negative
effect  on private  investment  because  of reduction  in aggregate  demand  and  contractionary
fiscal  and  monetary  policies. However,  as structural  reforms  are carried  out, investment,
particularly  private  investment,  should  go up in response  to a new  set of incentives. In
the case  of gross  investment  to GDP  ratio, the  projected  values  are generaUy  close  to the
actual  values. Both projections  and actual  outcomes  have, on average, remained  more
or less  at the same  level  indicating  that  not much  immediate  effect  of adjustment  on total
investment  was observed, ntor  was it expected. The average  projected  ratio of the
countries  reviewed  was up by one percentage  point, from 17 in 1987  to 18  in 1991,  the
corresponding  movement  of actual  outcome  of investment  ratio is that it remained  more
or less at the same level - 17 percent.
The closeness  of the projected  figures  of investment  ratios to actual figures  is
explained  by the fact that in most SSA  countries,  a substantial  part of public  investment
is donor financed. The projected  figures  reflect  estimated  future donor support  to the
public  investment  program,  which  generally  is realized. Analysis  done  elsewhere  shows
that private investment  in all of these  countries  continues  to stagnate,  indicating  weak
response  to reforms during the period 1986-90.2/ The total investment  figures for
most  SSA countries,  therefore,  reflect  continued  donor support  in the short-run,  which
may  not be sustainable  in the medium-  to long-run. The overall  trend suggests  that the
E/ Faruqee,  R. 'Private  Investment  in Sub-Saharan  Africa'  (World  Bank,  Africa  Regional
Office,  1992)14
pause  (lag between  policy  reforms  and the investment  response)  may  be long  in this set
of SSA  countries.
Economic  recovery  following  stabilization  and structural  reforms should  also
eventually  help  the savings  rate  go up, although  in the short-run  the savings  rate for low
income  countries  may remain  depressed  or even go down as the demand  management
policies  for stabilization  may  reduce  disposable  income  further  in the short-run. In the
case of savings,  the projected  values  are almost  always  higher than actual values. In
fact, average  domestic  saving  to GDP ratio for SSA  countries  has been  declining  (from
6.8% in 1986  to 3.4% in 1991). The  actual  values  are generaly  2 to 3 percentage  points
less than  the projected  values. This persistent  gap between  actual  and projected  values
of saving  rate partly reflect  the continuing  large dissaving  (deficit)  of the public  sector.
The observed  gap between  the savings  and investment  ratio  for the whole  period  implies
continued  dependency  on foreign  savings  for financing  investment.  Here one  should  note
that  the current  account  gap represents  foreign  financing  of the investment  program  and
the gap along  with domestic  savings  should  equal investment. For some  countries,  this
is not the case  and the estimates  of domestic  savings  may  be low for some  countries.  2/
Two  final indicators-growth  rates of exports  and GNP-are also used  to assess
the accuracy of PFP projections. Similar to stabilization  measures  and the savings
variable,  projections  of export  growth  rates  have  also been  generally  higher  than am al
2/ Another  estimate,  gross  national  saving,  would  have  been  a more  usefidl  ratio  - the  data  on
which  are  not,  however,  available  for many  countries  reviewed.15
outcomes.  The three years for which actual export growth fell far short of PFP
projections  are 1989  and 1991. This fall seems  to be more  than what one would  have
expected  from the impact  of weather  on agricultural  production  and terms of trade of
trade  effect  on the value  of exports. As for other  years  included  in the study  - 1987  and
1990  - the actual  values  were reasonably  close to what was projected. The aggregated
results  on export growth, however,  mask  wide differences  found in individual  country
performances.
Actual  GDP  growth  has generally  been  lower  than  what  was projected,  except  for
1988,  when  the actual  average  growth  rate turned  out  to be higher  than  anticipated. Such
an outcome  in Africa  is largely  due  to better  than  expected  agricultural  output  from good
weather  in 1988. One should  also note  that the impact  of adjustment  programs  on total
output in the short run is generally  confined  to increased  or more efficient use of
productive  capacity. Economies  with no slack productive  capacity  will not respond  in
the short run and growth in  those economies  will come primarily only through
investment,  with output  responding  only after a lag.  So the projected  GDP growth  in
PFPs in the short run may  generally  reflect  the extension  of a trend and the divergence
between  the actual  outcomes  and projections  seems  to be increasing  in recent  years and
this divergence  cannot  be explained  by unforeseen  weather  condition  and terms  of trade
movement.
Annex  I provides  country  by country  comparison  of the projected  values with
actual  outcomes.16
Overall, the majority of projected  values, as noted, have turned out to be
ambitious  in the sense that they diverge  from actual  values by more than 10%.  (See
Table  2).  Only in the case of investment  rates, were the majority  of PFP projections
generally  consistent  with actual  outcomes. This is due to the fact  that the major  part of
investment,  public  sector  investmnent,  is donor  driven  and therefore  projected  levels  tend
to be close to actual  values. Some  variation  between  projections  and actual  outcomes  is
found in stabilization  measures  - budget deficit and current account  deficit ratios.
Unlike  the investment  rate, the domestic  savings  rate has remained  at an extremely  low
level and  the divergence  between  the actual  and projected  savings  rate is glaring. As for
the outcome variables  - GDP and export growti rates - the deviation  between actual and
projected  values  are also substantial.  The findings  of the paper support  the conclusion
that generally  the pace of implementation  of policy reforms have been slower than
originally  anticipated  by the  design  of the adjustment  programs,  and that  these  programs
have  usually  fallen  somewhat  short of attaining  their stabilizalion  and growth  targets.17
Table 2:  Summary As-essment of PFP Countr  Proections
(total number of countries: 21)
Overly  Opdmifdo /thnidc  b  Realistic  or Cautious  c/
Budget  Deficit  (excl.  gras)  Bumd,  Gambia,  Ghn.  Kenya,  CAR,  Guia,  Madssasr,  Maawi,  Benin,  Guinea-Bisu, Masi,
a  % GDP  Lsotho, Mauritanh,  Senegal,  Togo,  Zire (5)  Mozambique,  Niger,  Tanzania  (6)
Uganda,  Zambia  (10)  _  . _
Cuent  Account  Deficit  As  Ghaa, Guinea,  Gunea-Biau,  Togo  (1)  Benin,  Buuadi, C.AR., Tne
% GD?  Lotho,  Maurtania,  Senegal,  Gambia,  Kenya,  Madagasr,
Uganda,  Zambia  (S)  Malawi,  Mall, Mozambique,
Niger, Tanzania, Zaire (10)
Gro  Domeic bnvtment  Madar,  Uganda  (2)  Bunndi, C.A.R., Guia,  Niger,  Benin,  TDe  Gambia,  Ghana,
As S GDP  Zaire,  Zambia  (6)  Guinea,  Guinea-Bisru,  Kenya,
Lesotho,  Malawi,  Mali,
Mozambique,  Mauritania,  Senegal,
Tanania,  Togo, Zaire (13)
Domesi Savinp  Buindi, C.AR., The Gambia,  Benin,  Guinea,  Kenya,  Mali,
As %  GDP  Ghana,  Gulasiaau,  Lesotho,  M-Ambique,  Niger.  Togo, Zaire,
Madagcr,  Malawi,  Mauiania,  Zambia  (9)
!  _______________  Senegal, Tanan,  Uganda (12)
Expor of Goods  and Non-  Bein, Bunindi,  CA.R., Gambia,  Ghan (1)  Guinea,  Guinea-Bisu, Kenya,
Factor  Services  Growth  Rate  Madagascar,  Mali,  Maurita,  Lesotho,  Togo  (5)
Mozambique,  Niger,  Senegal,
Tanani,  Uganda,  Zaire,  Zambia
(14)
GDP  Growth  Rate  Benin, C.A  , Gambia,  Guinea,  Guin  issau()  Bumdi, Ghana,  Keaya,  Lesotho,
Madagascar,  Mozambique,  Mali,  Malawi,  Tanzania,  Ugan
Maurna,  Niger Senegal,  Togo,  (7)
Zaire, Zambia  (10)
Notes;
a/ Ovedy  opdmitic  impies tt  aver  actual  values  fen short  of the  average  projected  value by 20 perent or over. For variables  such  as the budget  deficit
this  mans that the  government  commitment  has been  much  weaker  than  anticipated.
b/ Optimistic  inplhri  that  averge actual  values  fell  short  by more  than 10  pernt  but lowwer  tha  20  percnt
c/ The  average  projected  values  are within  10  peraent  of actul values  or the actual  valu  relect more  progre  than projected  values.
Nots:  EW  countries  have  been  excded - three  of them  - Soma,  Chad and  Sierra  Lone - for unrlual circumstances.  Five  other  counti  -Burkina
Fao, Rwanda,  Equatoil Guin", SaoTom*  e  Pincipe and  Comores- are also  excluded  bece  _  ths  countries  have  had  only  one  PFP  until November  1992,
the cutoff date for this stdy.18
GRAND  TOTAL  SIMPLE  AVERAGES
8udebt  Deffeft/GD-  Current  Acee  tlGOP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act  TOT
_  _  _  ~~~~~~~~~~~~Ad].
86  N/A  -10.84  86  NA  -14.57  -15.00
8T  -9.94  *11.81  87  -14.55  -15.32  -14.86
88  -8.82  -11.25  88  -11.60  -14.87  -15.21
89  -8.33  *8.83  89  -15.16  -16.02  -14.2Z
90  -7.58  *7.91  90  -16.06  -16.37  -14.08
91  -7.15  -7.30  91  -15.55  -16.58  -13.88
92  -5.47  N/A  92  -16.18  N/A  N/A
g.  -8.36  -9.42  Av  -14.  58  -15.8
Gross  Investment/GDP  D__o_tf_  S_  vfn_a_  _  DP
Yr  ProJ  cted  Actual  Yr  Proj  cted  Actual
86  N/A  15.45  86  N/A  6.81
87  16.67  17.49  87  6.26  5.55
U  18.10  17.92  88  6.98  5.47
89  16.85  17.78  89  7.00  4.86
90  1t.41  17.61  90  6.69  4.27
91  17.71  16.43  91  6.35  3.44
92  18.61  N/A  92  S.85  N  A
_Av  1T.35  17.45  6.66  4.72
Real  E port  GHFS  Growth Rate.  Resl  GDP  Grot  h Rate
Yr  Prol  cted  Actual  Yr  ProJ  cted  Actual
86  N/A  2.63  86  N/A  3.07
8T  6.95  4.67  8r  2.88  2.20
so  I  U  7  7  4.29  .46  88  3.77  4.83
89  7.78  2.55  89  4.02  3.23
90  6.66  7.68  90  3.74  2.06
91  9.30  -0.0  91  3.85  2.45
92  6.91  N/A  92  4.30  N/A
6vg.  o.99  3.26  Avg.  3.65  2.95
NOTE:  To m*k  them  coqaerobleo  the  averages  in  these  and  all  subsequent tables  are  based only  on the  years
for  ,Ich  both  projected  nd ectual  values  are available.19
Budget Defl¢lt(.)/GDP  Current Acoount,GDP
Grand Total Simple Averages  Grand Total Slmple Average
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In general,  CPA counties have  ieas  budget  and current  account  deficit  than non-
CFA countries. A!though,  there  are signs  of convergence  between  the two groups  with
regard to the budget  deficit, the task of reducing  budget  deficits seems to be equally
difficult  for both CPA and non-CPA  countries. Since 1989, the record of non-CFA
countries  seems to be significandy  better than CPA countries in attaining  targeted
reductions  in their budget  deficits.  This means  that although  the level of deficit on
average  in non-CPA  countries  is higher than CPA countries,  the trend especially  in
recent  years,  is clearly  better  for non-CPA  countries. Ihe observed  divergence  between
projection  and actual  outcomes  in regard  to current  account  deficit  is somewhat  simiLar
in both  groups  of countries. As for investment  ratios,  the projection  records  of CP-A  and
non-CFA  countries  are comparable. In the came  of savings  ratio, however,  the record
of CFA countries  seems  to be better  - in contrast  to non-CFA  countries,  projected  values
and actual  outcomes  are farly close  for CPA countries. As for other  outcome  variables
(export  growth  and GDP  growth)  CPA  countries  have  clearly  done worse  than  non-CFA
countries. The  average  export  growth  rate for CFA  countries  for the  period 1986-91  was
only 0,25%, as against  an average  rate of 4.5% for non-CPA  countries  during  the same
period, and the deviation  between  actal  and projecdon  is much more  pronounced  for
CFA countries  than for non-CFA  countries. A similar  picture  is evident  also in regard
to GDP growth  rate.
The grouping of countries by per capita income level do  not support the
hypothesis  that the group with comparatively  higher  levels  of income  would  reap more21
benefits  from adjustment  programs  (a hypothesis  that  emerges  from RAL m findings).
The comparatively  low per capita income countries (<$250)  - although have a
comparatively  higher  level  of deficit  have  been  able to come  closer  than  what  the higher
per  capita income level (>$400)  could.  More surprisingly, economies with
comparatively  loss per capita  income  (less than  $250)  have done better  in CDP growth
than the group with comparatively  high income  (more than $400). The average  GDP
growth  for the  comparatively  lower  per capita  income  (3.6)  was less than  half  percentage
point  of what was on average  projected  (4%), whereas  the comparative  higher  income
group  attained  on average  a growth  rate of 2.4% as against  an average  projected  rate  of
3.6%.
For some  years, the export dominant  economies  (with exports accounting  for
more than 25% of GDP) seem to have suffered  in GDP growth more than the other
group  of economies  (with  exports  less than  25%  of GDP). Interestingly,  TOT effect  on
current  account  balance  seems  to be comparable  in both groups.
The letigth  of adjustment,  including  the number  of PFPs, does  not seem  to have
any impact  on the accuracy  of projections.  This means  that  even  with the experience  of
several  PFPs (reflectng  longer  period  of adjustment)  the projections  do not  prove to be
better  predictors  of actual  outcomes. Despite  the fact  that length  of adjustment  has had
no effect  on ralism  of projections,  the actual  performance  of countries  with a longer
adjustment  period  in selected  areas  - investment  rate, export  growth  and GDP growth  -
- is, on average,  better than  countries  with shorter  adjustment  periods.22
Surprisingly,  debt  burden  seems  to have  had  no serious  effect  on the performance
of the countries  in attaining  stabilization  targets. On export  growth, the countries  with
comparatively  higher debt  burden  seem  to have  generally  done better  tan  groups  with
less debt  burden.
Annex II presents  the comparison  of projected  values and actual outcomes  by
various  groups  of countries.
IV.  IeoomMendatona
Further  country  by country  analysis  of PFP projections  and actual  outcomes  will
be useful  to ascertain  how much of the observed  divergence  between  projections  and
actual  outcomes  is due to external  factors  (such  as weather  and terms  of trade  effect)  and
how much  of it is due to lack of progress  in policy  reforms. The latter can be due to
factors  that were unforeseen  - as for example,  political  changes,  or internal  strife can
derail  progress. Less  than  targeted  progress  can bejust due  to unrealistc  targets  that  did
not fully  take into  account  politcal and institutional  reality. A future  country  by country
review  can look into these  questions  in depth.
In the future, the quality  and realism  of PFP projertons is likly  to improve  if
certain  steps  are taken  while  mnalang  these  projections. First, all PFPs  after the first one
should  contain a review  of the outcomes  in relation to projections  of previous  PFPs.
Second,  whenever  the chances  of falling  short  of projected  or targeted  outcomes  are high,
they  should  be noted. Third, using  references  such  as this  review,  the projections  could23
consider  benchmark  figures  based  on the exper;6ice  of successful  cases  of adjustment.
Fourth,  each  country  department  may  canry  out a review  from  time to time to assess  the
realism  of PFP projections  of the department. 'rhe Chief  Economist  Office  may  carry
out from time to time this ldnd of reviews  to assess  how good  are the projections.24
ANNI=  1.  COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY  I
Countries of Department 1
PFPs have been prepared for four counties  in CD1 - Benin, CAR, Guinea, and
Togo.  The congruence of  the average projected values and  actual values on  the
stabilization  measure, budget deficit to GDP ratio, is somewhat  weak for three of these
countries - CAR, Guinea, and Togo.  For these countries, the budget deficit figures
were consistently higher than actual values for nearly all years.  The record on current
account balance to GDP ratio is generally better.  If terms of trade movement is taken
into account, the actual deficit would be lower than the prqections  in three of these
countries, Togo, CAR and Guinea.  The projected gross investment to GDP ratio for
most countries has been within 2 to 3 percentage points.  In the case of Benin, the actual
values of gross investment  to GDP ratio was higher tha  prjected.  The projected values
of saving to GDP ratio have been generally  ambitious, except for Guinea. The projected
export growth rates are generally higher thancta  values for most countries with the
exception  of Benin  for 1987, 1988  and Togo for most years.  The projected  GDP growth
rates for CAR has proven to be particularly otmistic  - the aveage  actual GDP growth
rate was less one percent a year for 1986-91, against a projected growth rate of 3.3 a
year.  Also for other three countries, the averge  actual growth was one or  more
percentage point lower than what were projected.25
Countries  of Department  2
Three  countries  of CD2-Kenya, Uganda,  and  Somalia-have  had  PFPs. Somalia
was excluded  from this  review  because  civil war derailed  the adjustment  program  there.
Overall, the projected  and actual  values of two selected  stabilization  measures
show  significant  differences  in the two CD2 countries  reviewed-Kenya  and Uganda.
In Kenya,  the PFP targeted  the budget  deficit  to GDP  ratio to come  down to 4.3 percent
by 1991,  but the actual  ratio remained  about  9 percent. The experience  with regard to
the  budget  deficit  in Uganda  is almost  similar;  the  actual  deficit  attained  was 10.6  percent
in 1991,  against  a projection  of 6.5 percent.
The record on projections  of the current account  to GDP ratio appears  to be
similar in the two countries for several years - the projections  have proved to be
optimistic  for both countries. The actual  current  account  deficit  in Kenya  in 1989  was
twice the level of what was projected,  but for 1990  the values  were close and further
improvement  was registered  in 1991. For Uganda,  the actual  ratios for the years 1987
to 1991  were higher than what the PFPs projected. The average  picure in regard to
current  account  balance  for both countries  is similar  for both countries. When  correted
for terms  of trade effect,  both countries  current  account  balance  would  be less and even
narrower  than projected  figures.26
As for the  investment  variables,  the projecdon  records  of PFPs  for Kenya  is quite
good. The projected  investment  to GDP ratio for Kenya  for the years 1989  and 1990
proved  to be more  or less  the same  as the acual rate obtained  during  that period. Some
divergence  occufred  in 1991. For Uganda,  the projected  values  of investment  to GDP
ratio proved  to be somewhat  optimistic  for the years  1988  and 1989,  but were somewhat
closer  to actual  values  for 1990  and 1991.
The projected  estimates  of domestic  savings  to GDP  ratio in Kenya  were close  to
the actual  values  in 1990  and 1991. In the case  of Uganda,  the prcjectei savings  ratio
proved  to be highly  optimistic  and the acual savings  ratio  seems  to be declining  steadily
since 1986,  whereas  the projections  indicated  a rise of the ratio until 1989,  after which
a decline  was expected. As for other  response  variables  - growth  rates  of exports  and
GDP - strong  export growth  allowed  Kenya  to exceed  its targets  in  1989  and 1990.
Uganda's  actual values  of exports  show much  less  than projected  growth  for the years
1988  to 1991. The actual  values  of GDP  growth  rates  for both Kenya  and Uganda  have
also  been  close to projected  values  for most  years. The results  on GDP growth  rate,  for
Uganda  indicate  that target  rates for 1988  and 1989 were in fact exceeded.
Counai.  of D  =parent  3
Four countries  of CD3-Burundi, Comoros,  M  gascar, Rwanda,  and Zaire  -
have had PFPs.  Of these  five countries,  Rwanda  has had a PFP only recently  (April27
1991) and a comparison  of actuals with projected values  is not possible.  Comoros is also
dropped because  it has only one PFP until November 1992, cut-off  point of this exercise.
According to the latest available data, the overall progress on reduction of budget deficit
as a ratio of GDP is rather slow in all those CD3 countries.  Zaire's budget deficit ratio
has been consistently high and in one );ar  (1988) the actual figure was 10 percentage
points higher than what was projected. Burundi's budget deficit also exceeded  projected
values by a  substantial margin in some years.  Madagascar's performance on budget
deficit is slightly better - budget deficit to GDP ratio declined  in 1990, contrary to what
was projected. In 1991, the situation changed and Madagascar's budget deficit went up
contrary to what was projected. Since 1990, Madagascar's current account to GDP ratio
was better than projected.
The record with regard to investment  and savings rate has been mixed.  Actual
gross investment to GDP ratio for Burundi for the years 1988 to 1991 were lower than
projected value, although the gap somewhat  narrowed in recent years.  Madagascar has
experienced  widening discrepancies  between acthla  and projected values since 1987. For
the four countries, the average investment to GDP ratio has been 4 to 5 percent lower
than what was projected. As for savings to GDP ratio, the projected values have proved
to be generlly  ambitious. For Burundi, PFPs projected that savings to GDP rates would
be on average 5 percent, whereas the actual rate on average was less than one percent.
for  Madagascar, the projected rate on average is also 3 percent higher than the actual
outcomes.  For Zaire, the projected savings rate turned out to be similar to what were
projected.28
As for the response  vaiables, export  growth  rate has fluctuated  widely  but the
actual  outcome  on average  has been  always  less than  what was projected. The growth
rates of GDP in  AF3 countries have generally  fluctuated.  Madagascar's  growth
nosedived  in 1991, which  was not projected. The growth  rates of Zaire  and Comoros
have often been negative,  which was not projected. Zaire, whole  economy  has been
declining  for a while, has gone down to negative  GDP growth, whereas PFPs had
projected  three to four  percent  annual  growth  of GDP. Only  Burundi's  record on GDP
growth  is good for aU  the years except  1989,  and the actual  rate was on average  within
one percentage  point  of what was projected.
Countries  of De  mAent  4
PFPs have beeni prepared for  two countries in  CD4-Guinea Bissau and
Ghana.MII  The PFP projections  of the budget  deficit of the two countries  proved to
be ambitious  especially  for Guinea-Bissau.  A more  glaring  divergence  is evident  in,the
case of the current  account  deficit  of Guinea  Bissau. The PFPs consistently  projected
that  the  current  account  deficit  would  be between  13 to 15  percent  of GDP, but the  actual
gap always  exceeded  30 percent  and sometimes  even  reached  as high as 60  percent. The
other glaringly unrealistic  projection  relates to  savings rates.  Whereas the PFPs
projected  a positive  rate after 1989,  the actual  rate reached  almost  negative  8 percent  in
that year.  The projection  of export growth  has been slightly  ambitious  except  for the
IW/Because  of current political uncertainty and past reversals of policies, Sierra Leone, the
third country in CD4 on which PFPs were prepared, is left out.29
year  990 when  exports  shot up to a very high rate of 75%.  The GDP growth  rate in
Guinea  Bissau for 1988 has been higher than projected,  but after 1989 the growth
declined  at a rate faster  than  what was projected.
The experience  of projections  of the four Ghana PFPs, where the adjustment
program  has  been  considered  most successful,  is quite revealing. The budget  deficit
remained  unchanged  at five to six percent at over the 1987-90  period.  The PFPs,
however, consistently  projected  a budget deficit of three percent until 1991.  The
experience  of Ghana  shows  that  even  in a comparatively  successful  program,  the budget
deficit  targets  proved  to be extremely  difficult  to reach. The picture  on current  account
deficit  is similar. However,  if the terms  of trade effect  is taken  into account,  the actual
current  account  deficits  would  have  been substantially  less.
Ghana's experience  in regard to gross investment  is similar  to other countries.
The actual  values  of gross  investment  were just marginally  lower  than projected  rates.
But  the domestic  savings  ratio  has proved  to be much  more  difficult  to change  and  it has
remained  between  6 and 9 percent,  as against  projected  values  that are between  11 and
15 percent.  Ghana's export growth  rate on average  has been the same as projected.
However,  the actual  growth  rate varied  a great deal from year to year.  The projected
growth  of GDP  seems  to be slightly  more  optimistic  than  what  has actually  been  attained
-on  average  it attained  an annual  rate of 4.8% growth,  as against  5.1% projected.30
Countries of Deprtent  5
Six countries  of this department  - Burldna  Faso, the Gambia,  Mali,  Mauritania,
Niger  and Senegal  - are in adjustment  and have  had PFPs.fl/  Burldna  Faso strted
its program  only  recently  and therefore  its PFP projections  cannot  be compared  to actual
values.
The actual  outcomes  on budget  deficit  to GDP  ratio show  that  in two of the AF5
countries - the Gambia, Mali - countries the ratio projected proved to be close to the
actual  ratio.  Even  for the other three  countries,  the actual  budget  deficit  wa .generally
within  3 to 4 percentage  points  of what was projected. The gap between  the projected
and actual values of the current account  balance.  The picture on investment  is
encouraging,  but the savings  to GDP ratio  is not. As for the growh rates  of export  and
GDP, the actual and projected  values have tended to be fluctuating,  reflecting the
weather-related  fluctuation  of agricultural  production  in the Sahel  countries. In addition
to the weather-  related  uncetainty,  many  of the  countries  of this  departnent  are cufrently
going through  political  changes,  which have accentuated  the uncertainty  facing these
resource-poor  economies.
The projected (or targeted) deficit to  GDP ratio for the Gambia was not
significantly  different  from the actual outcomes. There was marked  improvement  in
1988,  when  the actual  and projected  values  were close,  but the budget  deficit  increased
in 1989,  instead  of decreasng  as projected.  The budget  deficit  decreased  during 1990-91
11 Chad, also in this department,  had two PFPs. Chad is not included  in this review  because
of serious  political  and military  problems  that have  derailed  its adjustment  program.31
and by 1991,  the deficit  was about  4% of GDP  in comparison  to a target  of 2 percent.
The projected  and actual values  on the current account  deficit  are also close, although
the overall  deficit  is still  high  - an average  of 14  percent  of GDP. Gross  investment  to
GDP ratio has also been  generally  realistic. Unlike  most  other countries,  the domestic
savings  ratio for the period 1987  to 1989  was also close to what was projected. The
PFPs  projected  a significant  rise  in saving  rate  to GDP  ratio  after 1989,  a trend  not borne
out by the actual  behavior  of the savings  to GDP ratio. As for export  growth,  the actual
growth  has been  very volatile  and occasionally  has exceeded  projections.  The projection
on GDP  growth  rate has been  fairly accurate  - the average  growth  rate was 4 percent,
similar  to what was projected  on average.
In the case of Mali, the deficit  to GDP  ratio was lower  than the projected  value
in 1990  and 1991  and in all other years  projected  figures  are higher. The projection  of
current account  to GDP proved realistic.  The gross investment  to GDP ratio also
generally  behaved  quite favorably,  as did the domestic  savings  ratio. The performance
of export  growth  has been  impressive. In the case  of Mali, also  the actual  GDP growth
rate on average  was about 2.5 percent and the corresponding  projected  rate was 2.5
percent.
In the case of Mauritaia, the actual  budget  deficit  to GDP ratio was generally
higher than  the projected  values. The PFPs projected  a sharp decline  in budget  deficit
between  1990  and 1991,  which  did not happen  in reality. The current  account  deficit  to
GDP ratio consistently  has been higher  than projected  values  and this does not change32
when  the terms  of trade  effect  is taken  into account. The gross  investment  to GDP ratio
has been  close  to projected  values. However,  in the case  of the domestic  savings  ratio,
the actual  values  are significantly  lower  than  PFP projected  values. As for exports,  the
growth  performance  has been  generally  much  lower  than  PFP projections. The average
export  growth  projected  for the period 1987-91  was 6.7 percent  as against  actual  rate of
negative  one percent during the same period.  GDP growth  rate has been declining
precipitously  and did not remain steady  as the PFPs  projected.
Niger's  budget  deficit  to GDP ratio  has also  been  on average  about 3 percentage
points  higher  than  what the PFPs  projected  although  1991  is an exception  in this regard.
The projections  of  current account  balance have been fairly accurate.  The gross
investment  to GDP  ratio has been somewhat  lower  than  projected  values  but the saving
rate in recent years has apparently  exceeded  PFP projected  values (as in most other
countries). The PFP projections  have  also  been  overly  optimistic  in regard  to growth  of
exports. The average  growth  projected  for the period 1989  to 1991  was 5.2 percent,
whereas  the actual  outcome  was viratually  no growth  during  that  period. The actual  GDP
growth  rates  have  also  been  widely  fluctuating,  whereas  the projection  expected  a steady
rate of growth  of three to four  percent.
Senegal  is another  country  which  has had five PFPs. The budget  deficit  to GDP
ratio  has been  slowly  declining,  yet the ratio  has been  significantly  higher  than  what  was
projected  or targeted  for all the years  except  one (1991). The average  actual  deficit  was
more than 2 percentage  points higher than what was projected. The current account33
deficit  consistently  has been  between  eight  to ten percent  of GDP  - on average  about  4
percentage  points higher than the projections.  Regarding domestic savings, ratio
prqections have been consistently  optimistic.  The actual export growth rate also
consistently  fell short of what the PFPs projected. Even  in the case of Senegal  with 5
PFPs, the  projections  (takdng  the latest  ones  available)  have  diverged  quite significantly
from actual values of selected indicators.  The expected results of adjustment,  as
envisaged  in PFPs, seems  to be far from fully  realized  in Senegal.
Countries  of Department 6
Five  countries  of this  department-Tanzania,  Malawi,  Lesotho,  Mozambique  and
Zambia  - have had PFPs.  Highly volatile  figures for Mozambique  complicate  the
analysis. The countries  of this Department  have had a good record of reaching  target
budget  deficit to GDP ratios.  However,  the record on current  account  deficit  to GDP
ratio is not that good. The actal performance  with regard  to investment  is impressive,
consistently  higher  than  projected  values  for all the  countries  except  Zambia. In contrast,
the  performance  with  regard  to domestic  savings  to GDP  ratio  is poor. The actual  export
growth  rates of these countries  have also been  close to the projected  values. In 1989,
the growth of exports in several  CD6 countries  increased  faster than what the PFPs
projected.  With  regard  to GDP  growth  rates, the acal  values  were  close  or even  higher
than  projections  until 1989  for all countries. Growth  of GDP in recent  years, however,
fell short of projections  in some  of the countries  of the departnent.34
Mozanbique's  record in reducing  deficit  to GDP ratio has been slightly  better
than  what  the PFPs  projected,  although  the level  of deficit  remains  extremely  high (over
25% of GDP). Also,  the record  on the  current  account  to GDP  is similar,  except  for the
initial year, when the projections  seem  to be cautious. Similar  to few other countries,
gross investment  to GDP ratio is also better than projected. On the other hand, the
savings  ratio  has been  consistently  negative  but consistent  with  wha; the PFPs  projected.
The growth  rate of exports  has been  impressive  especially  in 1990  and 1991. The GDP
growth  rate has slid down  significantly  from over 5 percent  in 1989  to around  3 percent
in 1991,  whereas  the PFPs projected  a steady  growth  momentum.
The PFP projections  on Malawi's  fiscal  performance  have  been  realistic. On the
current account,  the projection  has also been generally  accurate,  especilly in recent
years.  If the terms of trade effect  is taken into account, the deficit would  have been
actually  less  than  what  was  projected  in 1991. The investment  projections  were generally
accurate, again largely reflecting  donor supporL The actual domestic  savings  ratio,
although  generally  close to, but generally  lower  than, projected  values. Exports,  after
a sharp unexpected  decline  in 1989, showed  a remarkable  growth, consistent  or better
than the projection,  and GDP growth  has been  close to projected  values.
Tanzan  is also another  case of doing  better  than the targeted  reduction  of the
fiscal deficit.  The performance  on the current account  deficit in Tanzania  is also
impressive,  with actal  performance  better than  what the PFPs projected. The record3S
on gross  investment  to GDP has also boen realistic,  but the export  growth  and  domesic
saving  ratio  has done poorly  In reation to what was projected  on growth  rates  of GDP.
According  to the latest  projections  available  for Lesotho,  the budget  deficit  was
to decline  in 1991, which  is not borne  out by actual  outcomes. A similar  optimism  is
also evident  in the case  of the current  account  deficit. The investment  outcomes  seem
to be markedly  better than the projections. Also, the actual  investment  outcomes  are
strikingly  high (in 1991, it was 94 percent of GDP).  In sharp contast, the average
domestic  savings  to GDP ratio is about -50%, which  the PFPs projected  at a rate of
about 15%. The projecdons  of the export  jrowth rate  have  also  been  overly  ambitious,
whereas  the projected  GDP growth rate was actually lower than what was actually
experienced.30
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22.18  23.7I  Av.  14.10  13.2
Real E port  GNFS  Growth  Rate  Real GDP  Growth  Rate
Yr  ProJected  Actual  Yr  ProJected  Actual
86  N/A  12.40  86  N/A  1.60
87  N/A  6.00  87  N/A  0.50
88  2.50  17.30  U  2.80  6.60
89  2.00  2.10  89  4.00  3.70
90  2.40  3.70  90  2.60  0.70
91  3.80  6-50  91  3.80  -0.10
92  2.40  N/A  92  2.90  N/A
Avg.  2.62  8.00  Avg.  3.22  2.1743
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KENYA
udget  Doeficit/GOP  Current  Accotmt/GDP
Yr  Projected  Actuat  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act  TOT
- __.  Ad.  _
86  N/A  -4.40  86  N/A  - 2.60  - 2.60
87  N/A  -?.60  87  N/A  *7.70  - 5.50
so8  NA  -6.50  88  N/A  - 8.00  -7.00
89  _  3.80  7.10  89  5.50  *10.00  - 6.30
90  - 6.30  -7.40  90  - 7.30  - 7.30  - 2.80
91  4.30  -9.00  91  7.10  - 5.80  N/A
92  -4.10  N/A  92  5.50  N/A  . N/
Av.  -4.63  -7.00  Avg.  -6.35  -6.90  -4.84
Gross Investment/GDP  Domstic Savings GDP
Yr  Prol  cted  Actual  Yr  Pro|  cted  Actual
86  N/A  21.80  86  N/A  21.90
87  NIA  24.30  87  N/A  19.20
a8  N7A  25.00  88  N/A  19.80
89  23.30  24.60  89  20.70  17.20
90  24.70  23.70  90  20.90  18.90
91  23.60  20.20  91  18.20  18.80
92  24.80  N/A  92  21.40  N/A
Avg.  24.10  23.27  Avg.  20.30  19.30
Real EJ  ort  GNFS  Growth Rate  Real  GDP  Growth Rate
Yr  Prolected  Actuat  Yr  Prolected  Actual
86  N/A  9.80  86  N/A  7.20
87  N/A  0.90  87  N/A  5.90
88  N/A  4.60  88  N/A  6.00
89  6.10  9.20  89  5.10  4.60
90  7.20  17.30  90  5.20  4.30
91  0.60  0.50  91  4.00  1.70
92  16.20  N/A  92  5.00  N/A
7.23  6.88  [:Q  4.8j  4.9545
Kenya 1: PFP  -Projectlons  and Actuals  Kenya  2: PFP  - Projections  and Actual.
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UGANDA
ludget Deflcft/GOP  Current  Account/COP
tnij  ludfng orants_
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act  TOT
86  N/A  -6.70  86  N/A  -1.60  -1.90
87  -7.70  -4.70  87  -3.30  -4.40  -7.80
88  -4.00  *6.60  88  *4.70  -8.60  -6.90
89  -3.90  *6.80  89  -4.90  -7.50  *6.60
90  -5.70  -8.60  90  *9.80  -11.90  -5.10
91  *6.50  -10.60  91  -10.40 _  13.j0  N/A
92 L  6.40  -6.80  92  -10.40  N/A  NI
L-5.70  -7.35  -6.62  -9.12
Gross Investment/GOP  =  Domestfc Savings/GDP
Yr  ProJected  Actuat  Yr  Prolected  Actual
86  N/A  9.80  86  N/A  6.90
87  12.00  11.60  87  5.20  6.10
88  16.00  10.50  88  7.10  3.90
89  18.00  10.20  89  8.20  2.20
90  12.20  11.20  90  -3.20  -0.90
91  14.70  12.00  91  3.50  -1.10
92  15.30  N/A  92  4.60  N/A
14.58  11.10  Av5  44S.  2.04
Resl  Export  GNFS  Growth Rate  Real  GOP  Growth Rate
Yr  ProJected  Actual  Yr  Prolected  Actual
86  N/A  2.40  86  N/A  0.60
87  -14.70  2.50  87  3.90  6.70
8a  13.50  *  4.10  88  5.40  7.60
89  17.30  1.10  89  5.10  7.30
90  15.60  -3.70  90  6.30  4.00
91  15.30  -8.30  91  5.00  4.10
92  17.50  N/A  92  5.00  4.10
9.40  -2.50  5.12  5.6347
Uganda 1: PFP- Projections and Actuals  Uganda 2: PFP - Projections and Actualb
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BURUNDI
ludbet  DOeficit/GOP  Current Account/GOP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act TOT
86  N/A  - 7.10  86  N/A  *11.40  -11.40
87  N/A  -16.80  87  N/A  -17.80  -12.90
88  *  9.70  -11.20  88  -17.60  -14.40  -10.30
89  - 8.20  - 9.60  89  -21.30  -13.10  - 7.60
90  - 6.40  -13.40  90  *20.30  -20.80  -15.10
91  - 9.00  *12.40  91  -16.60  -18.10  -12.60
92  *10.30  -13.20  92  *20.70  22.SO  N/A
Avg.  -8.72  -11.96  Avg.  -19.30  -16.87  -11.65
Gross Investment/GDP  _  Domestic  Savings/CDP
Yr  ProJected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual
86  N/A  11.70  86  N/A  1.20
87  N/A  22.70  87  N/A  6.90
_U  19.00  15.00  88  6.20  1.60
89  21.00  16.70  89  5.10  4.40
90  21.00  17.70  90  5.50  -2.60
91  19.00  16.20  91  1.90  -2.80
92  17.00  18.50  92  3.50  N/A
Avg.  19.40  16.93  Avg.  4.44  1.24
Rel  Export GNFS  Growth  Rate  Real GDP  Growth  Rate
Yr 1.  ProJected  Actual  Yr  Prolected  Actual
86  N/A  -13.10  86  N/A  3.30
87  _  6.80  87  N/A  5.50
as  4.70  10.50  U  4.10  4.90
89  4.60  2.90  89  4.50  1.50
90  6.00  4.80  90  4.50  3.50
91  22.00  21.50  91  3.30  5.00
92  17.00  - 1.90  92  4.00  4.00
_  _  Av=.  10.86  3.67  Av.  4.08  3.9640
Burundi  1: PFP  - Projectlons  and A*tuals  Burundi 2: PFP  - Prolojtions and Aotuals
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MADAGASCAR
Bud  e  fict/GP_  Current  Acc unt/GDP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act  TOT
86 _  N/  -3.50  86  N/A  -8.30  -8.30
87  N/A  -3.40  87  N/A  -10.00  -5.60
88 I  2.50  -3.30  88  -10.20  *10.80  -6.60
89  4.90  -5.10  89  - 9.30  -8.80  -2.30
90  -6.'  -4.80  90  *16.90  -12.90  -4.80
91  -4.80  -10.40  91  -13.30  -11.40  -4.70
92  -2.90  N/  92  -10.40  N/A  N/A
A!2.  -4.38  -5.08  Avg.  -12.02  -10.37  -5.38
Gross Investment/GDP  Dom_  _tic  SavirgvFGDP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  ProJected  Actual
86  N/A  13.40  86  N/A  6.50
........... J.t  ~  N/A  9.40  87  N/A  5.50
88  13.70  9.50  as  9.80  6.00
89  13.80'  8.40  89  11.50  6.20
90  20.30  11.40  90  8.20  4.00
91  17.30  4.50  91  8-  30  -0.40
92  15.40  N/A  92  8.30  N/A
Av9i.  16.10 L  L9.43L  9.22,  4.63
Real  Ex  rt  GNFS  Growth Rate  Real  GDP  Growth Rate
Yr  Prolected  Actual  Yr  ProJected  Actual
86  N/A  -1.80  86  N/A  2.00
87  N/A  4.90  87  N/A  1.20
a8  5.00  8.20  88  3.20  3.40
89  8.60  16.90  89  3.40  4.10
12.10  12.00  90  4.50  3.10
91  10.70  4.80  91  4.60  -6.30
92  10.70  N/A  92  4.70  N/A
-9.42  4.77  4.08  1.25
9.42  4  77  A  - - -~~~_5)
Madagascar  1  Madagascar  2
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8udo,t  Defictt/GDP_  Curront  Aecc  ut/GOP
Yr  ProJected  Actual  Yr  ProJected  Actual  Act  TOT
86  N/A  .11.80  86  N/A  *7.00  -7.00
87  -16.30  -13.90  87  -15.90  -8.30  -9.00
88  -13.80  -22.40  88  -16.20  *6.00  *10.50
89  -16.10  -16.00  89  -14.50  -6.40  -7.50
90  -1S.10  -16.00  90  -18.40  -13.20  *16.60
91  -12.90  N/A  91  -16.70  N/A  N/A
92  * 11 80  N  92  -15.10  N/A  N/A
_  Avg.  -15.33  *17.08  Avg.  -16.25  -8.48
Gross  Investment/GDP  D.  __  IrestIe  SavingsGCDP
Yr  ProJected  Actual  Yr  Pro acted  Actual
86  N/A  13.20  86  N/A  13.90
87  18.10  14.20  87  12.30  12.20
UI  18.50  14.40  as  12.90  12.20
89  13.40  14.60  89  11.20  11.90
90  13.50  11.50  90  8.50  11.90
91  14.00  N/A  91  10.00  N/A
92  14.50  N/S  92  41.50  N/A
Avg.  15.88  13.68  A  11.23  12.05
Real  EJ  ort  GNFS  Growth Rate  Real GOP  Growth Rate
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Prolected  Actual
86  N/A  -6.00  86  N/A  4.70
87  -5.20  5.60  87  3.00  2.70
88  1.80  4.00  a8  3.50  0.60
89  2.50  -3.20  89  3.30  -2.00
90  6.90  9.30  90  3.S0  -1.90
91  4.90  N/A  91  3.70  N/A
92  4.50  N/A  92  4.00  N/A
Avg.  1.50  -0.73  3.33  _  0.1553
Zalre 1 - PFP Prolectlons and Actuals  Zaire 2 - PFP Prolections and Actuals
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GHANA
udset  Deficit/GOP  Current  Acc  unt/GOP
Yr  ProJected  Actuat  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act  TOT
86  N/A  -5.50  86  J/A  -2.90  *2.90
87  -2.80  *4.70  67  N/A  -4.30  -2.20
s88  3.20  *5.10  as  -3.10  -5.00  -1.60
89  -2.90  -4.70  s9  -3.40  -1.10  -5.60
90  -2.70  *5.40  90  -5.10  -7.60  -2.20
91  *4.50  4.30  91  *4.50  -6.10  N/A
92  -4.70  N/A  92  -3.320  . /A  .. A
Avg.  *3.22  '..84  -3.33  -4.88
Gross  Investment/GDP  'orestte  Savings  GDP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual
86  N/A  9.60  86  N/A  8.00
87  N/A  13.30  87  MIA  7.20
88  16.00  14.20  86  12.90  8.30
89  14.70  15.50  89  11.30  7.90
90  18.00  16.00  90  13.10  6.10
_  91  16.90  16.50  91  14.30  8.10
92  17.80  N/A  92  15.00  /
16.40  12.90  7.60
Real  Export  GUFS  Growth  Rate  Real GOP  Growth Rate
Yr  Prol  eted  Actual  Yr  Pro ected  Actual
86  N/A  S0.50  86  . l/A  5.20
N/A  -3.80  ST  t/A  4.80
as  8.50  11.10  8s  6.00  5.60
89  21.60  11.40  89  5.00  5.10
90  7.00  6.80  90  4.80  3.20
91  12.80  14.90  91  4.50  5.10
92  6.70  N/A  92  5.00  N/A
12.48  11.05  vg.  5.08  4.75
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Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act ToT
~~~~~~~~Adl.
86  NLA  -1l6.00  86  N/A  -os  50.80
87  N/A  -3.00  r?  -. 30  -33.80  -35.00
88  j/A  j0.60  .L  *13.10  4.90  -46.00
as  -3.6  -6.40  89  -15.50  .. 49.20  -55.30
°.0  2.3  1.50  90  t  0  -25.30  36.10
91  -1.6  5.30  9L  -13.40  -36.10  N/A
92  -0.3  N/A  92  .11jR  N/A  N/A
Avg.  -1.50  -5.54  vg.  -13.57  40.90  -4.64
Gross Invtm/DP  M  M  tic  Savft  UrsP
Yr  ProJected  Actual  Yr  ProJected  Actual
66  N/A  24.30  86  N/A  *1.30
87  27.20  33.30  r  -0.90  20.50
as  23.90  34.20  -1.10  -24.60
89  15.70  34.30  8s  0.00  -7.90
90  15.40  24.70  90  2.00  -4.20
91  15.20  27.10  91  .0.90
92  s15.00  N/A  92  N/A  N/A
18.73  2965  Av.  0.76  -11.23
Real Export G)NS  Growth  Rate  Resl UOP  Growth  Rate
Yr  Prolected  Actual  Yr  Prolected  Actual
86  N/A  10.60  e6  N/A  -1.00
or  24.00  21.50  67  4.70  6.00
es  15.30  8.50  so  2.80  6.60
e9  21.80  4.20  69  5.10  5.00
90  11.10  75.00  90  4.50  3.00
91  9.50  -8.90  91  4.40  3.10
92  9.10  N/A  92  4.50  JN/A
15.13  16.48  A.33  3.8257
Gulnea Bissau 1  Gulnea Bissau 2
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GANBIA
Budbt DeffcIt/GDP  Current  Aecount/GDP
Yr  ProJected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act  TOT
86  N/A  -18.50  86  N/A  -20.70  *30.10
8r  -17.50  -16.80  8r  -31.60  -16.10  -21.50
88  - 8.20  4.10  88  -28.10  .13.10  .18.10
89  - 6.00  - 8.20  89  -21.10  -18.10  -12.30
90  *  3.70  - 4.10  90  -14.80  -13.20  7  r.90
91  - 2.20  - 4.10  91  -13.90  -13.00  - 9.40
92  2.00  N  A  92  -16.70  N/A  N/A
Avg.  *6.60  A9.30  vg.  -21.03  -15.70  .16.55
Gross Investment/GDP  flmtic  Savl  s/GDP
Yr  Projected.  Actual  Yr  ProJected  Actual
86  N/A  19.60  86  N/A  8.60
87  N/A  15.50  87  7.40  6.40
88  18.70  17.60  a8  7.40  10.10
89  21.00  20.60  89  7.10  8.00
90  19.00  19.30  so  14.10  3.60
91  19.10  19.00  91  14.70  7.90
92  19.20  N/A  9.60  N/A
Avg.  19.40  18.60  Avg.  10.05  8.27
Real Export GNFS  Growth Rate  Real  GDP  Growth Rate
Yr  Prol  cted  Actual  Yr  Prolacted  Actual
86  N/A  - 5.30  86  N//A  2.80
S8T  |N/A  3.70  or  *  /A  1.70
88  5.70  - 7.50  88  3.40  4.30
69  6.50  14.90  89  3.60  5.20
90  4.90  -24.30  . 90  4.50  2.30
91  4.50  2.70  91  4.50  4.00
92  4.90  N/A  92  4.50  N/A
Av.  L.30  -2.63  Avg.4.10  3.839
Gambia 1: PFP - Projectlons and Actuals  Gambia 2: PFP - Projectlons and Actuals
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MALI
Budget  DefIcIt/GOP  Current  Aecotat/GDP - - ._  __  _  =-
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act  TOT
86  1/A  -11.90  86  N/A  -21.90  -23.50
87T  N/A  *10.20  87  N/A  *15.30  -19.60
88  N/A  *10.30  88  N/A  *17.00  -19.20
89  - 7.80  -9.80  89  -16.80  -14.40  -15.90
90  . 9.00  .8.50  90  -15.00  -14.70  -18.60
91  -13.70  -12.00  91  -16.30  .13.70  -11.60
92  *10.70  **A  92  -13.70  I/A  N/A
Avg.  -10.30  -10.45  Avg.  -15.45  -16.17  -19.36
Gross Investment/GOP  Domestic  Savng  sGOP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual
86  N/A  23.00  86  N/A  1.20
87  NA  23.00  87  N/A  6.00
88  N/A  20.10  88  N/A  2.409
89  17.40  21.00  89  0.10  4.90
90  21.00  i  22.20  90  5.00  5.60
91  23.50  22.50  91  5.30  6.00
92  22.40 4  N/A  92  6.40  N/A
Avg.  21.08  j  21.97  Avg.  4.20  4.35
Real Ex ort  GNFS  Growth  Rate  Real  GOP  Growth  Rate
Yr  Pro  ected  Actual  Yr  Prolected  Actual
86  N/A  14.60  86  N/A  16.10
87  N/A  3.20  87  N/A  -2.40
88  N/A  -2.90  Ns  /A  0.20
89  2.80  17.70  89  5.00  7.50
90  10.00  3.70  90  _  0.00  2.40
91  13.60  -15.10  91  0.80  -0.20
92  3.00  N/A  92  5.90  N/A]
Av.  -7.35  3.53  An.  2.93  3.9361
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MAURITANIA
u  Oet  Deficit/GO  Current  Acea  /DP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act  TOT
86  N/A  1.50  86  N/A  -35.00  -36.70
87  3.30  0.00  87  *16.30  -28.60  -28.10
so  4.30  -1.10  88  *14.20  *22.30  -28.90
89  5.70  -5.20  89  -13.10  -14.50  -40.10
90  0.00  -0.80  90  -15.50  -22.50  -32.50
91  -4.TO  1.70  91  -9.80  -14.40  -21.60
92  -3.00  N/A  92  -7.90  N/A  N/A
-v.  1.72  -1.08  Avg.  -13.78  -20.46
Gross Investment/GOP  D_  _  C.mi  tfe  Saving  GOP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Prolected  Actual
86  N/A  30.60  86  N/A  7.70
87  20.70  31.50  87  15.20  14.20
88  22.80  23.20  88  17.20  11.40
89  13.50  18.80  89  9.80  12.60
90  16.10  19.90  90  12.10  5.50
91  15.80  16.10  91  13.20  8.20
9  q2  X  22.70  N/A  92  9.40  N/
Ag.  1.  78  21.  Ag  13.50  10.38
Reat Export  GNFS  Growth Rate  Real GOP  Growth Rate
Yr  Prolected  Actual  Yr  Pro  ected  Actual
86  N/A  5.10  86  N/A  5.70
87  13.40  1.40  87  3.30  1.90
as  6.40  -0.40  8a  4.00  1.70
89  4.20  3.90  89  3.50  4.80
90  5.10  -2.20  90  3.60  -1.80
91  4.60  -6.60  91  3.80  2.60
92  3.20  N/A  92  2.40  N/A
6.74  -0.78  v.  3.41.8463
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NIGER
Bud  t  Detfcit/GD,  _  Current  Account/G0P
Yr  Projected  Actuat  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act  TOT
86  N/A  -9.20  86  N/A  -7.80  -6.60
87  N/A  - 9.50  87  N/A  -9.90  -10.40
88  N/A  -10.00  88  N/A  -9.50  *6.3D,
89  -9.80  -10.30  89  -11.60  -10.40  -5.90
90  *9.30  -10.60  90  -11.40  -11.10  *4.50
91  -8.80  -4.00  91  -10.60  -7.20  -4.00
92  -8.50  N/A  92  -10.10  N/A  N/A
A.  -9.30  -8.30  Avg.  -11.20  -9.57
Gross  Investment/GOP  D  _  omestic Savings/GDP
Yr  Proj  cted  Actual  Yr  ProJected  Actual
86  N/A  13.30  86  N/A  7.90
87  N/A  10.50  87  N/A  - 8.00
88  N/A  19.80  88  N/A  18.70
89  13.80  12.30  89  6.50  9.10
90  11.00  12.80  90  3.70  8.70
91  10.80  7.20  91  4.00  6.50
92  11.20  N/A  92  4.40  N/A
Avg.  11.87  10.77  Avg.  4.73  8.10
Real  Export  GNFS  Growth Rate  Real GOP  Growth Rate
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Prolected  Actual
86  NIA  2.70  86  N/A  4.50
87  N/A  9.10  87  N/A  -3.60
as  N/A  -1.90  88  N/A  5.60
89  4.00  2.90  89  5.10  0.20
90  15.30  0.00  90  3.10  -1.80
91  8.20  -0.90  91  3.10  1.90
92  3.40  N/A  92  3.20  N/A
9.17  0.67  Avg.  3.77  0.10
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SENEGAL
udnet  Defcift/(3P  - Current  Acco  t/GDP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act  TOT
____  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Adj.
86  N/A  -3.60  86  N/A  *12.10  -11.90
87  -0.90  -2.30  8?  10.30  -11.60  -12.90
88  -0.20  2.50  88  8.60  -10.80  -10.90
89  0.20  -4.00  89  .8.20  -9.80  .10.00
90  -2.60  -4.20  90  .7.90  *7.50  -8.50
91  0.10  0.20  91  -7.20  -7.90  N/
92  1.30  NA  92  -6.20  N/L  N/A
Avg.  3S  -2.34  Avg.  -1.77  -8.53
Gross Investment/GOP  _  'omestfc SlaevingGDP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actuat
86  N/A  11.70  86  N/A  6.30
87  13.70  12.40  87  8.60  6.90
88  13.80  12.70  88  10.70  7.90
89  14.00  12.70  89  10.50  7.50
90 L  15.20  13.30  90  10.20  8.60
91  12.90  13.70  91  9.20  8.80
92  12.30  12.40  92  9.40  7.50
13.65  12.70  Avg.  9.77  -.64
Real  Export  GNFS  Growth Rate  Real GOP  Growth Rat,
Yr  Pro ected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual
86  N/A  15.20  86  N/A  4.60
8?  11.80  1.50  87  4.30  4.00
as  7.30  5.00  as  3.70  5.10
89  7.80  -3.00  89  3.80  -0.40
90 T  1.40  -1.20  90  4.60  4.50
91  7.90  2.40  91  1.30  1.20
92  7.60  _  5.30  92  5.10  2.40
7.24  3.60  An.  3.54  3. 06667
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Budget  Deficft/GCP  Current  Account/CDP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act  TOT
86  N/A  -11.90  86  N/A  .30.2  -30.2
87  N/A  -13.60  87  N/A  -14.5  -13.1
88  N/A  -19.80  88  N/A  -37.1  -31.3
89  -14.30  -16.60  89  *10.3  -22.20  -25.9
90  -11.  60  7.70  90  - 9.5  *24.20  -50.7
91  - 2.20  - 1.00  91  *37.7  -36.20  N/A
92  - 1.20  -0.90  92  32.1  -"4.50  N/A
Av.  -7.33  *10.21  -22.40  -29.84
Gross  Investment/GDP  Domcstfc  SavJ  s/GOP
. - .-  .- 
Yr  ProJected  Actual  Yr  ProJected  Actual
86  N/A  45.40  86  N/A  8.00
87  NMA  44.90  87  N/A  12.00
88  _NA  58.00  a8  N/A  8.90
89  18.40  33.00  69  14.60  10.80
90  18.80  40.80  90  15.50  15.90
91  53.30  45.80  91  14.60  9.60
92  48.80  58.90  92  16.60  14.40
Avg.  4.83  46.69  Av.  15.38  11.37
Real E port  GNFS  Growth Rate  _Re1  GDP  Growth Rate
Yr  Proljcted  Actual  Yr  Prolected  Actu  l
86  N/A  6.10  86  N/A  0.70
87  N/A  35.10  87  N/A  7.10
8  I  N/A  24.90  s  N/A  11.90
89  10.00  51.40  89  3.50  12.40
90  10.00  *13.80  90  4.00  9.30
91  -8.20  -17.20  91  7.70  4.60
92  10.00  4.10  92  7.10  3.90
5.45  12.94  Av5.  S.56  7.13
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MALAWI
at  Iet DtfcIt/0P1Current  Acc__mt/Gp
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act  TOT
86  N/A  12.70  86  N/A  - 8.00  -10.10
8?  - 6.20  -10.80  8T  - 7.60  -5.10  *  7.60
a8  *SJ.50  -8.00  as8  -7.30  *9.10  - .40
89  - 6.30  - 6.70  §  *  8.40  -13.40  7  ?.80
90  -5.80  - 6.800  - 8.50  - 9.00  - 6.90
91  - 6.00  - 6.30  91  - 8.50  -11.10  -6.80
92  -10.00  - S.40  92  .18.70  N/A  N/A
-6A63  *8.10  _L  9.83  *9.28
Gross Investment/GDP  _retfc  Savings  /P
Yr  ProJected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual
86  N/A  12.30  86  N/A  10.10
_  ?  87  1  16.70  15.40  or  14.30  13.00
a88s  .40  16.70  8I  15.20  12.00
89  17.30'  20.30  89  6.90  10.90
90  18.40  19.10  90  12.40  14.30
91  19.00  18.60  91  12.80  12.00
92  17.60  N/A  92  13.20  N/A
Avg.  |  17.73  17.40  Avg  12.47  12.05
Resl  Exoort  GNFS  Growth Rate  Real GOP  Growth Rate
Yr  Pro ected  Actuat  Yr  P  Actual
86  /A  -6.70  86  N/A  1.10
87  3.70  -0.50  87  3.30  0.0
8  3.90  -4.60  88  3.50  3.30
6o  4.40  -10.20  89  3.70  4.10
90  7.70  47.00  90  3.40  4.80
91  7.00  5.30  91  5.00  7.80
92  -11.10  N/A  92  4.50  N/A
Avg.  _  _2.60  5.05  v.  3.90  3.60
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sudoet  Deficit/GP-  Current  Ace  P
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act  TOT
86  N/A  -17.70  86  s/A  -15.60  -14.00
87  -20.30  -21.70  ST  -34.70  -47.80  -46.80
as  -28.10  -26.60  a  -67.30  -52.90  -51.90
89  -24.60  -25.50  89  -69.80  -58.80  -59.20
90  -36.30  -29.50  90  -63.30  -54.40  *53.40
91  -32.00  -27.60  91  -60.30  -58.90  -58.90
92  -27.50  N/A  92  69.40  NA  NA
Avg.  -28.13  -24.77  Avg.  60.80  -48.07  _
Gross Investment/GDP  Damstic  Sav_nosF_DP
Yr  ProJected  Actual  Yr  Pro ected  Actual
86  N/A  0.0  86  N/A  0.00
87  17.50  24.10  87  *  9.00  -114.00
881  27.70  33.40  88  -15.60  -16.40
89  26.00  35.50  89  *19.00  -16.60
90  27.00  38.10  90  -18.00  -11.70
91  35.00  41.00  91  -17.90  - 9.90
92  1  42.70  _  /A  92  -17.60  N/A
Avg.  29.32  28.68  _16.22  -11.43
Real  Ex  rt  GNFS  Growth Rate  Real  GP Growth Rate m  O  - .
Yr  ProJected  Actual  Yr  ProJected  Actual
6  *  -8.40  86  N/A  1.80
or  s.90  8.30  87  1.20  4.60
as  8.10  10.20  SS  5.90  5.50
S9  9.20  7.80  5.00  5.30
90  6.60  4.50  90  4.70  1.50
91  14.50  17.10  91  6.00  2.70
92  13.80  N/A  92  5.00  N/A
10.18  6.58  Avg.  4.43  3.5773
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TANZANIA
Budset  Dofcet/8OP  Current  Account/GDP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act  TOT
. j~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~A]
86  N/A  -7.90  86  N/A  -7.20  - 8.10
87  -11.10  -8.20  87  U23.10  .14.20  -18.80
88  -12.30  -7.70  as  -19.10  -17.50  -20.30
89  -12.20  -8.20  89  -29.80  *26.50  -23.30
90  -9.30  -7.00  90  -34.80  -29.40  -20.60
91  -8.60  -4.40  91  -33.10  -27.40  N/A
92  -6.10  N/A  9  -31.  -31.60  N/A
Avg.  -9.93  -7.23  -28.57  -21.97
Gross Investment/GDP  Domestfc Savings/GDP
Yr  ProJected  Actuat  Yr  ProJ  ected  Actual
86  N/A  17.90  66  N/A  8.80
8T  22.90  25.90  87  5.30  3.80
as  27.40  30.50  88  4.40  3.10
89  25.50  28.80  89  4.80  -5.50
90  19.30  27.10  90  - 3.50  -12.40
91  19.70  21.80  91-  3.50  -13.60
92  20.00  30.20  92  0.10  -11.80
Avg.  22.47  26.03  Avg.  1.27  -3.94
Real Ex  rt  GNFS  Growth  Rate  Real GDP  Growth  Rate
Yr  Prolected  Actual  Yr  Prolected  Actual
U.  N/A  .9  90  86  N/A  3.00
87  23.60  5.80  87  3.70  4.70
88  11.20  0.10  88  4.00  5.10
89  11.00  17.10  89  4.30  3.60
90  10.50  0.10  90  4.50  3.20
91  10.90  -2.40  91  4.50  3.70
2  lt.10  10.60  92  4.70  4.20
13.05  3.06  Avg.  4.28  3.9375
Tanzanla 1: PFP-  Prolectlons and Actuals  Tanzania  2:.PFP-  Projections and Actuali




4 ~ ~ ~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~4
-14  goi  .St  *  01*
so  S  o  90  o  0 
Yew  _Pubtbone  -l  +"AtuaIe  *A*bA&I. TOT  djusd
o1etloone  -+'AtuuI  TOT a  T*rms  Trad
Tanzanla  3: PFP-  Projectlons and Actuals  Tanzania  4 - PFP Projectlons and Actu
30
IL  .4  10--- 
ot/  _  .51o 
Ist
00  67  00  60  90  el  02  '  07  @6  6*  00  0t  02
Year  Yew
-PJefloon  +Atuml  ProJellem  +Aetiue
Tanzanla  5 - PFP Projectlons and Actuals  Tanzania 6: PFP  Projectlons and Actuals
Re  Ewt  ffO  We  re_b  %Pl  OMO  Rob
10  - - - -g  - -
*  e  eT  "  "  00so  92  I
£4  -1  - -
F.1  6-tblm---oM76
ZAMBIA
Bub*Ot  Doficit/GoP  Current  Acc_nt/GOP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act  TOT
_________~~~~~~~~~~~  Ad].
86  N/A  -28.30  86  N/A  -23.00  N/A
87  - 9.80  -10.30  s8  *46.S0  -16.70  *26.50
88  - 5.30  -13.10  88  45.10  -7.20  *25.70
89  - 9.20  -11.70  89  -4.80  -5.10  -2.10
90  -11.50  -11.20  90  -16.20  -10.80  *23.20
91  - 3.80  -13.80  91  -13.00  -13.20  N/A
92  - 2.90  N/A  92  -14.00  N/A  N/A
Avg.  *7.08  -14.73  Avg.  -7.90  -12.67
Gross Investment/GDP  Domestic Savings  IGDP
Yr  ProJected  Actual  Yr  ProJected  Actual
86  N/A  23.80  86  N/A  22.60
87  14.70  13.90  87  10.50  18.00
88  15.10  11.40  88  12.80  18.70
89  13.60  9.90  89  17.60  3.50
90  17.10  15.30  90  13.90  14.60
91  18.70  I  13.50  91  19.20  12.00
92  19.50  N/A  92  12.60  N/A
Avg.  16.45  14.63  Avg.  14.43  14.90
Real Ex  rt  GNFS  Growth Rate  Real GDP  Growth Rate
Yr  Prolected  Actual  Yr  ProJected  Actual
86  N/A  1.90  86  N/A  0.70
ST  4.20  - 6.00  87  2.50  2.70
88  4.00  - 5.90  as  3.00  6.30
89  10.30  - 1.40  89  3.40  - 1.00
90  -0.90  15.90  90  1.90  *  0.50
91  0.30  -16.30  91  3.10  - 1.80
92  7.60  N/A  92  3.90  N/A
4.25  -1.97  Avg.  2.97  1.0777
Zambia  1 - PFP  Projections  and  Actuals  Zambia  2- PFP  Prolootions  and  Actuals
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An analytical  groupiLe  of the  countries  for  the purpose  of comparing  actual  values
with projections  would permit  a better understanding  of which factors are generally
associated  with the observed  divergence  between  projected  and actual  values.  The
shortfall  in reaching  stabilization  targets  can be due to external  circumstances,  internal
unexpected  developments  (such  as change  of political  leadership),  a weak  commitment
to policy  reforms  and weak  institutions.  The paper,  therefore,  makes  several  analytical
groupings  that will permit some insight  into the roles of these factors in producing
varying  degrees  of congruence  between  projected  and actual  values.  12/
CPA and Non CFA Countries
The first country  grouping  was carried out by CFA and non-CFA  countries.
Membership  in the CFA zone takes away the chance of manipulating  a key policy
variable,  the exchange  rate. If there is any difference  between  the actual  and projected
values,  can these  differences  be associated  with  membership  of CFA? In the absence  of
exchange  rate depreciation,  CFA economies  lose  in competitiveness  and this will  impair
its abilities  to attain  projected  progress  under  PFP. Companng  the experience  of CFA
and non CFA countries  on PFP projections  produce  some  interesting  results.
In general, CFA countries  have done better than the non-CFA  countres in
containing  budget  deficits. The average  actual  budget  deficit  of CFA  countries  has been
WV  in analytical  groupings  of  the countries,  Lesotho  was  excluded  because  of unusually  high
projected  figures  for  saving  and  investment.79
about 2 percentage points less than the average for non-CPA countries.  However, the
divergence between projected  and actual budget deficit seems to be comparable  for the
two sets of countries.  The average budget deficit to GDP ratio for the CPA group of
countries came down slowly from 9.7%  in  1986 to about 9.3%  in  1987, against a
projected figure of 8.5%.  The record of subsequent  years is similar - the actual figures
of 1988 to 1991 were consistently  one or more percentage  points higher than projected
or targeted deficit.  Until 1989, the record of non-CPA countries with regard to the
budget deficit is similar - projected values are less than actual outcomes.  After 1989,
the  non-CFA countries on  average succeeded in  reducing their  budget deficits as
projected by PFPs, although  the actual deficits are still slightly higher than the average
level in the CFA group of countries.  This ;neans that even though the level of deficit
on average is still higher in non-CFA countries than CFA countries, the trend seems
better for non-CFA countries. It is worth noting that Senegal  is responsible  for much of
the improvement in CFA budget deficits in 1991.
The PFP projections  on current account  balance for CFA countries  also shows a
narrower gap for this group of countries in comparison  to non-CPA countries.  Both
groups of countries, however, have had a similar record in regard to projections on the
current account balance.  The current account gap for CPA countries was, however,
higher than what was projected  for all the years except 1991. For both groups, if terms
of trade adjustments  were made, the gap would have  been much less, even less than what
was projected.  As for investment  ratios, the projection records of CFA and non-CFA
countries  are comparable. But in the case of savings  ratios, the records of CFA and non-CFA countries are quift different.  For CFA countries, the projected and actual values
of savings ratios are fairly close, whereas the divergence of those values for non-CFA
countries  is pronounced.
The projected growth of exports for CFA countries proved to be consistendy
optimistic, indicating the  fact  that  the  increasing overvaluation of  the  CFA  has
undermined  competitiveness  of the economies  and intenal adjustment  programs have not
been adequate to create competitiveness. The average growth of exports projected for
CFA group of countries  for the period 1987-91  was over 5 percent per year, whereas  the
outcome  was just above 0% per year.  In sharp contrast, the non-CFA  group attained on
average  nearly  4.5 percent growth of exports per year, as against a projected  growth rate
per year of seven  and half percent. The GDP growth rates, projected  and actual of CFA
countries  are generally  lower than the growth rates for non-CFA  countries and the actual
outcomes  of non-CFA  countries seem  closer to targeted  growth rates than what is evident
for CEA countries.  The averag* actual GDP growth rate by CFA countdies  was only
about 40 percent of the projecteI rate, whereas non-CFA countries attained nearly 90
percent of the GDP growth rate projecked  by PFPs.
Income Grogn
RAL m has concluded  that Bank adjustment loans have had a strong positive
effect en middle income countries, wh reas low income countries have clearly lagged
behind in availing full benefits from adjustment  loans.  The different income levels may81
stem  from  other factors  such  as implementation  capacity,  infrastructure,  etc. The PFP
countries  were grouped  in categories  of income  levels  to examine  the expenence  of
policy  progress  tsuch  as meeting  stabilization  targets)  and adjustment  outcomes  (growth
of savings,  investment,  exports  and GDP).
The countries  were grouped  into three  per capita  income  groups-countries  with
less than $250 per capita income, countries  with income between $250-$400  and
countries  with  over $400. Six countries  are in group  1 (less  than $250), nine  countries
in the middle  group  and five  countries  are in the  top group  (>  $400). The  budget  deficit
of the lower  income  group  is higher  than the other  groups,  but the actual  outcomes  are
close  to what  was  projected. The  current  account  deficit  of the low income  group  is also
high, between  15 to 25 percent,  but the deficits  are close to projections. As for the
budget deficits  of the other two income  groups,  the actuals  seem to be higher than
projected  values  for most  years, although  they are at a lower  level  than for the group  at
below  $250  per capita  income.
In regard to the savings  rate, there is a difference  between  the three income
groups. The group  with the compartively  high income  (>  $400)  seems  to have  done
the best  - the savings  rate on average  is about 12%  of GDP,  in comparison  to 7% for
the group with $2504400 per capita  income  and a negative  one percent for less than
$250 per capita  group.  The divergence  between  the actual  and projected  values  is,
however,  similar  for all the groups.  In export  growth,  the middle  income  group has
done the  worst - the  average growth rate has  been less than  one percent - markedly  less82
than  what  was  projected. Surprisingly,  the group  with  less than $250  per capita  income
has done quite well in export  growth  - although  actual  values  seem  to have  fluctuated.
In GDP growth,  the group  with  per capita  income  over $400 seem  to have  done worse
than the group with below $250  per capita  income. This is surprising  and somewhat
different  from the RAL  m conclusion  for all developing  countries  that middle  income
countries  seem  to have  benefitted  more  than  low-income  countries  from  adjustment  loans.
Srouping  By Vulnerability  to External  Fatrs
External  factors  can significantly  affect  the chances  of the economies  to attain
stabilization  targets  or achieve  expected  outcomes  of an adjustment  program.  The
vulnerability  to external  factors  such as an abrupt  negative  shift in the terms of trade
depends on  the size and significance  of  the external sector and the degree of
diversification  of the export  sector. Therefore,  this paper utilizes  another  classification
on the basis of the size and significance  of the extenWal  sector  and diversification  of
exports  in order to assess  the vulnerability  of regional  economies  to external  factors.
Six countries-Guinea,  Togo, Zaire,  The  Gambia,  Senegal  and Mauritania-were
placed  into one group. The  exports  of these  countries  acoounted  for more  than 25% of
GDP for the period 1989-90,  and they were compared  with the rest of the group.f/
The  purpose  was to see whether  the experience  of export  dependent  countries  was  any
L3/Another  classification  of the  countries,  separated  10  countries  with  one  commodity
accounting  for  more  than  60 percent  exports  from  die  rest. The  observed  differences  between
the  groups  were  minimal.83
different  from the rest. The comparison  shows,  that  economies  with  a high dependency
on the export  sector  seem  to have  a lower  budget  deficit  than the other  group. However,
there is very little difference  between  the two groups of countries  in regard to the
accuracy  of deficit  projections. The record on current  account  deficit  is generally  the
same  as on the budget  deficit. Also, the group  with high export  dependency  has done
poorly  in the growth  of exports  and  GDP,  in comparison  to the rest of the  group. Again,
the difference  between  projected  and actual  values  for  export  dependent  countnes  and the
other group is similar  - actual  growth  is over 2 percentage  points less than what was
projected.  No difference  is seen between  the groups in regard to investment  rates.
Surprisingly,  average  savings  rate of export-dominant  economies  has remained  between
10 and 13  percent,  relatively  close  to what  was  projected.  In comparison,  the rest of the
group has had dismally  poor savings  ratios-zero to about 4 percent-that are totally
divergent  from projected  rates  of about 5 percent.
Lengt  of Adjusmn
The length  of adjustment  progmms  could  be a factor  in explaining  the varying
experience  with  PFP  projections. ks noted  before,  since  the projections  are taken  from
the latest  PFPs, the more  PFPs a country  has, the more  reasonable  the projections  are
expected  to be.  More  importantly,  the longer  duration  of adjustment  programs  would
ensure  that  the economy  can meet  the  targets  as well  as achieve  the projected  adjustnent
outcomes.  The  paper  first  look,  at the  grouping  RAL  lm carried  out -intensive  adjustors
and other  adjustors. Intensive  adjustors  are those  which  have  had at least  2 SALs  or at
least  3 SECALz. The rest are grouped  as "other  adjustors".84
The actual budget deficit of the intenively adjusting  countries  has been on
average  about  9.2 percent,  in comparison  to over 11 percent  for the countries  grouped
as 'other adjustors'. As for the current  account  deficit,  the performance  of intensively
adjusting  countnes  fell clearly  short  of PFP targets. Other  adjustors  seem  to have  had
outcomes  closer  to projections,  which  did not seem  to anticipate  a past  narrowing  of the
deficit.
Both  groups  have  had  a similar  experience  in regard  to investment  - actual  values
were close  to PFP  projections.  As  in most  groups,  savings  rate projections  proved  to be
optimistic  - more so in the case of intensive  adjustors  than other adjustors. Export
growth  of both groups  has also been  generally  less than projections  with the intensive
adjustors  doing  better  in this regard. In GDP  growth,  intensive  adjustors  did well  during
initial  years  but since  1988,  the growth  mte has  been  declining  against  a projected  steady
growth.  The other adjusting  group also had much less growth than what the PFPs
projected.
Debt  Burden
Finally,  debt can  inhibit  the ability  of some  economies  to achieve  desired  results.
The last grouping  used  in the paper  is on the basis  of the burden  of external  debt. The
countries  were  grouped  into  three  - highly  indebted  group,  moderately  indebted  and  least
indebted. The results are as follows.  The highly  indebted  group consists  of four
countries  (Guinea-Bissau,  Mauritania,  Mozambique,  and  Tanznia) that  DODIGDP  rates85
of more  than 150%  percentL  A reference  group  is set up witi compatively less debt
burden. This  group  consist of 8 countries  (Benin,  CAR,  Rwanda,  Ghana,  Burldna  Paso,
Niger and Senegal)  that have DOD/GDP  ratio of less than 75%.  The modaely
indebted  group  is in between,  with indebtedness  between  75%  and 150%. Debt burden
seems to have had a very limited  difference  in the relationship  between  actual  and
projected  values. A comparison  of the first  group  (highly  indebted)  and the third  group
(compaatively  less debt  burden)  shows  that  the projections  on budget  deficit  for  the first
group have been rather cautious  or realisdc, whereas  in the case of low indebted
countnes,  the actual  deficits  have  been  higher  than projected  for most years.
There  is some  difference  between  the two  groups  in the GDP  growth  rate. The
group  with  the comparatively  higher  debt  burden  suffered  serious  decline  in GDP  growth
rate since 1988,  whereas  the PFPs  projected  a steady  4 to 5 percent  growth. In some
contrast, the group with comparatively  low debt burden continued  to grow, though
modestly  but at a higher  rate than  the group  with  comparatively  higher  debt  burden. The
actual  GDP growth  rate of the low-debt  group approached  the target levels  in recent
years.86
LOU  INDEBTED  COUNTRIES
udget  DeficIt/GDP  Current  Acet/GDP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act  TOT
86  N/A  -10.40  86  N/A  -13.50  *13.SO
8S  - 10.30  *11.10  ST  - 9.60  -13.90  -13.30
88  - 10.00  .10.00  A  -10.70  .12.30  -11.10
89  - 9.40  -11.00  89  -12.50  -12.70  -11.30
90  :-  9.30  *10.80  90  -12.10  -12.70  -11.10
91  - 8.80  - 9.10  91  -11.90  -12.40  -12.00
92  6  8.10  N/A  VA2  -11.20  N/A  N/
Avg.  -9.56  10.40  Avg.  O36  2.80  -
Gross Investment/GDP  Do  tfc  Savings/GDP
Yr  ProJected  Actual  Yr  Prolected  Actuat
86  N/A  11.60  86  N/A  0.70
B7  13.30  12.00  87  1.10  1.10
Be  14.20  13.00  Be  2.10  3.70
89  13.20  12.80  89  3.10  2.90
90  13.90  12.40  90  3.60  1.80
91  13.30  11.60  91  3.70  1.70
92  13.40  N/A  92  4.10  N/A
Avg.  13.S8  12.36  Avg.  2.72  2.24
Real  Exrt  GUFS  Growth Rate  Real  GOP  Growth  Rate
Yr  Prolected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual
86  N/A  9.20  86  |/A  2.90
r7  8.10  S.90  .r  1.30  -0.20
as  2.90  -0.90  as  4.10  6.00
89  8.40  -0.80  89  3.70  t.80
6.00  2.00  90  3.60  1.60
VI  8.70  1.10  1  3.10  3.20
92  6.00  N/A  92  3.90  N/A
6.82  1.02  3.16  2.4887
Budget  Deficit(-)/GDP  Current  Account/GDP
Low Indebted  Countries  Low Indebted  Countries
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MODERATELY  INDEBTED  COUNTRIES
8  --  - Deffeft/GDP  Current  Ae
Yr  Projected  Actu  t  Yr  Projected  Actusl  Act  TOT
66  N/A  . 9.80  86  N/A  - 9.90  -10.90
87  9  20  - 10.90  87  .11.90_  -10.30  - J.40
as  - 6.90  - 8.70  ,  -11.10  - 9.90  -8.70
89  - 6.80  - 8.40  89  -11.40  -11.10  .. 00
90  *  7.20  - 8.70  _  *12.40  -12.90  .7.10
91  - 6.70  - 8.90  _  91  .12.80  -12.80  9.60
92  - 6.50  N/A  92  -13.40  N/A  N/A
Av  *  -7.36  -9.12  A  -11.92  .11.40
Gros Investment/GDP  D  tfc  Savfnas(GDP
Yr  Projected  Actuat  Yr  ProJected  Actual
_  86  1  N/A  15.80  86  N/A  7.60
87  16.70  16.80  ST  10.00  0.30
.88  17.80  16.70  as  11.20  -1.40
89  18.00  17.00  _  89_ _  11.10  -2.80
90  18.60  17.10  90  10.80  -1.60
91  18.70.  15.70  91  9.30  -2.40
19.00  N..J  AL  .......L92  9.00  N/A
Avg.  17.96  16.66  Avg.  I10.4  -1.58
Real  Ex rt  GNFS  Growth  Rate  Real  CDP  Growth  Rate - P*  - m 
Yr  Projected  Actuat  Yr  Prolected  Actual
86  h1/A  0.30  86  N/A  3.60
87  2.70  3.30  87  3.60  2.80
88  2.90  2.30  a8  3.30  4.10
89  5.80  2.70  89  4.10  3.90
90,  7.10  5.80  90  3.80  2.70
91  10.20  2.00  91  4.00  2.20
92  6.50  N/A  92  4.60  N/A
Avg.  5.74  3.22  Avg.  3.80  3.1489
Budget Doticit(-)/GDP  Current Account/GDP
Moderately Indebted Countrlos  Moderately  Indebted Countries
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HIGHLY  INDEBTED  COUNTRIES
8udget Deficit/GDP_  Current Account/GDP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act  TOT
- - _________  ________  ~~~~~~Adi.
86  N/A  -13.70  o6  N/A  .26.20  -25.80
87  -11.20  -14.80  a?  -26.40  -28.20  -31.00
88  -11.60  -18.40  U  -*13.70  -29.00  -34.60
89  -10.90  -18.80  89  *26.60  -30.80  .36.00
90  -14.30  -14.80  90  -28.90  *28.40  -33.20
91  -12.60  -1.7O  91  -25.90  -30.00  -25.50
92  _°0.00  N/A  92  -28.40  N/A  0/A
Avg.  - -12.12  -13.7  0  Avg.  -24.30  -29.28
Gross Investment/GDP  Damestic Savinos/GDP
Yr  ProJected  Actual  Yr  Prolected  Actual
56  N/A  19.30  86  N/A  7.60
87  _  20.60  25.70  a?  4.20  0.30
88  23.40  26.50)  8S  3.50  -1.40
89  18.90  25.50  89  2.60  -2.80
90  19.00  25.00  90  1.30  -1.60
20.90  23.90  91  3.00  -2.40
92  24.00  1N/A  92  1.00  N/
Avg.  20.56  25.32  2.92L  -1.58
Real Export  GNFS  Growth Rate  Real GDP  Growth Rata
Yr  |  ProJeted  Actual  r  ProJected  Actual
86  N/A  -0.10  86  N/A  2.00
8a  14.80  6.20  87  3.30  3.80
88  9.00  2.50  as  3.90  5.10
89  11.30  6.30  89  4.30  3.50
90  6.50  18.70  90  3.80  1.10
91  8.00  -3.40  91  4.40  2.10
92  9.00  N/A  92  4.10  N/A
_  _g.9.92  A6.06  vg.  3.94  3.1291
Budget DOficit(-)/GDP  Current Account/GDP
Highly Indebted Countrles  Hlghly Indebted Countries
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Real Export of GNFS  Growth Rate  Real GDP  Growth Rates
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INTENSIVE  ADJUSTERS
8ud9  t  Deficit/COP  Current Account/GDP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act  TOT
- - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Ad].
86  N/A  - 9.90  86  N/A  -17.80  -17.60
87  - 8.00  -10.50  87  -14.50  -16.10  *16.30
88  - 7.10  -10.60  88  - 5.30  -15.60  -16.90
89  7.10  -11.60  89  -13.00  -16.50  -16.80
90  . 7.80  - 9.30  90  -14.40  -15.60  -15.30
91  - 6.90  - 4.00  91  -12.60  -15.80  -12.10
92  v-6.70  N/A  92  -13.80  N/A  _  /A
Avg.  -7.38  -9.20  -11.96  -15.92
Gross Investment/GOP  Domestic Savings/GDP
Yr  ProJected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual
86  N/A  18.00  86  N/A  7.30
87  18.40  19.30  87  7.40  5.50
88  19.20  19.30  88  9.00  6.00
89  16.90  18.70  89  8.80  4.80
90  18.30  18.50  90  8.60  5.00
91  17.60  16.30  91  9.20  3.50
92  17.90  N/A  92  8.30  N/A
Avg.  18.08  18.42  Avg.  8.60  4.96
Real Export  GNFS  Growth Rate  Real GOP  Growth Rate
Yr  Prolected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual
86  N/A  8.70  86  N/A  2.20
87  10.50  4.00  87  3.60  2.70
88  6.70  3.60  88  3.60  5.90
89  9.10  5.00  89  4.00  3.50
90  6.40  16.90  90  3.90  2.20
91  _  6.80  -1.60  91  3.80  2.20
92  6.40  N/A  92  4.20  N/A
7.90  5.58  Avg.  3.7893
Budget DefIoct(-)/GDP  Current Aocount/GDP
Intensive Adjusters  Intensive Adjusters
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OTHER  ADJUSTERS
Budget  Deficit/GOP  Current  Acen  /lDP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  ProJected  Actual  Act  TOT
._  _  _._  ZAdl.
S6  N/A  - 12.00  86  N/A  -14.40  -14.40
87  12.00  -13.70  87  -14.80  .13.00  -11.30
88s  9.70  -11.20  88  *15.00  .12.30  -10.40
89  9.00  -10.60  89  -13.90  -10.70  - 8.80
90  8.80  - 10.80  90  -14.80  -12.10  -11.30
91  8.70  - 8.80  91  *15.30  *14.10  -12.30
92  7.80  N/A  92  _  14.70  N/A  N/A
Avg.  -9.64  -11.02  vg.  -14.76  -12.4
Gross  Investment/GDP  Domestic Savings GOP
Yr  Proiecte-  Actual  Yr  ProJected  Actual
86  N/A  14.70  86  N/A  5.60
87  15.30  15.20  87  5.80  6.90
88  15.70  15.30  88  5.60  6.90
89  15.20  15.50  89  6.10  6.50
90  15.40  14.70  90  5.90  4.60
91  16.10  14.20  91  5.50  4.60
92  17.20  N..  92  5.10  N/A
Avg.  15.54  14.98  Avg.  5.78  5.90
Real  Export  GNFS  Growth Rate  Real  WOP  Growth Rate
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual
86  N/A  -4.60  86  N/A  4.60
87  4.90  5.20  87  1.50  0.70
88  0.70  -3.00  88  3.30  2.70
89  4.60  -1.70  89  3.80  2.10
90  7.00  -1.80  90  3.00  1.50
91  12.20  0.83  91  3.50  2.50
92  5.70  N/A  92  4.20  N/A
A!2.  5.88  -0.10  As.  3.02  1.9095
Budget  Deficit(-)/GDP  Current  Acoount/GnP
Other Adjusters  Other Adjustors
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Other  Adjusters  Other  Adjusters
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EXGNFS  MRE THAN  25X Of  GDP
3det  Oaffe  it/CJw_  Current  Account/GOP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  ActuaL  Act  TOY
86  N/A  11.00  86  N/A  -16.70  -17.10
87  - 7.80  - 8.60  37  -6.30  -14.80  -15.00
88  - 4.70  - 8.30  88  -2.80  -.1.90  -15.40
89  -5.60  - 8.40  89  *  10.80  -10.30  *10.10
90  - 6.70  - 7.30  90  - 12.40  -12.80  -12.20
91  - 4.80  - 6.30  91  1.40  -12.20  9.50
92  - 4.10  N/A  92  12.70  N/A  N/A
Avg.  -5.92  .7.781  Avg.  -10.74  *12.40_
Gross  Investment/GOP  Domestic Savin  sXGOP
Yr  Proj. cted  Actual  Yr  ProJected  Actual
86  N/A  19.60  86  N/A  12.70
87  16.90  17.90  87  11.10  12.20
88  18.30  17.20  88  13.30  12.60
89  16.60  16.50  89  12.70  10.90
90  17.80  17.10  90  13.40  10.80
91  4  17.40  15.90  91  13.00  9.90
92  18.00  N/A  92  10.50  N/A
Avg.  17.40  16.92  Avg.  12.70  11.28
ReaL  Export  GNFS  Growth Rate  ReaL  GDP  Growth Rate
Yr  ProJected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual
86  N/A  2.70  86  N/:  3.60
87  5.20  3.30  87  3.50  2.30
88.  3.00  2.70  88  3.70  4.40
89  5.60  -3.00  89  3.70  1.90
90  2.50  -1.40  90  3.60  1.10
91  4.10  -0.80  91  3.50  1.70
92  5.00  N/A  92  4.00  N/A
Ayg.  4.08  0.16  Avg.  3.60  2.2897
Budget  DOeficit()/GDP  Current Account/GDP
EXGNFS  more than 25% of GOP  EXGNFS  more than 25% of GOP
d*tg  S0ilSE4~W  ~wI  SO.ODs  o 
t~~~'  *2  so  el  ft  Yew1  |
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-Pmosdon  4+otefth  ?CT  *Terms  dI lhGd
Giross  Domestlo Inv*stMent/GDP  Domestic  Savlngs/GDP
EXGNF-S  more than 2S% of GDP  EXGNFS  more than 25% of GDP
4  ___S'S______I_______'s_so__s_SI__2
Y"r  Year
Real Export of GNFS Growth Rate  Real GDP Growth  Rate
EXGNFS  More than 25% of GOP  EXGNFS  More than 25% of GDP
d-  as  a  v-  a*  - /"
_____________A  __  6  ,  ?  '  -Ae  Nb  dI  2
"  (GN@  mor  0tha 25%  of GO  (Fmoe  thant  @25%oD
_~~@e_  +wetl0||@~  -~@  - -98
EXGNFS  LESS  THAN  25 X  OF  GOP
udeet  Deficct/GCP  Curr.ot  Ace  /nt/GOP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act  TOT
- - ________  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Adi.
85  N/A  - 10.80  86  N/A  -13.6u  -14.00
?.  - 10.90  *13.30  8.  - 13.70  15.60  .14.80
88  *  10.70  -12.60  88  - 15.70  .16.30  _  '5.1O
89  - 9.80  -12.90  89  17.20  .18.70  *16.20
90  - 10.70  -12.20  90  *17.80  -19.00  *15.00
91  - 10.40  7.80  91  17.50  -18.6  -14.60
92  - 6.10  N/A  92  -17.80  N/A  N/A
-10.50  -11.76  .16.38  -17.64  T  _
Gross  Investment/GOP  Domestic  Savinas/GDP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual
86  N/A  13.50  86  N/A  5.30
87  16.50  17.30  87  5.00  4.20
88  18.00  18.30  88  5.40  4.60
89  17.00  18.40  89  5.20  3.60
90  17.20  17.80  90  4.90  2.10
91  17.80F  16.-  91  4.60  1.80
92  18.90  4A  92  4.40  N/A
Avg.  17.30  17.70  Avg.  5.02  3.26
Real Export  GNFS  Grouth Rate  Real GDP  Growth Rate
Yr  Projected  Actuat  Yr  Projected  Actual
86  N/A  1.90  86  N/  2.80
87  7.70  5.60  87  2.60  2.10
as  4.90  0.60  8  3.80  5.10
89  8.80  2.50  89  4.20  3.80
90  8.60  12.70  90  3.80  2.50
91  11.70  0.30  91  4.00  2.80
92  7.80  N/A  92  4.50  N/A
An.  8.34  4.34  An.  3.68  3.2699
Budget DOflctt(-)/GDP  Current Account/GDP
EXGNFS  loss than 25%  of GDP  EXGNFS  loss than 25%  of GDP
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Real  Export  df GNfS Growth  Rate  Real  GDP  Growth  Rate
EXGNFS  toss  than  25%  of GDP  EXGNFS  toss  than  25%C  of GOP
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COUNTRIES  WITH  PER  CAPITA  INCOME  LESS  THAN  S2SO
Budge  t  Deffc1t/GoI  2  Current  Acc  CDnt/GOP
Yr  ProJected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act TOT
- ~~~~~~~~~~Adj.
86  N/A  -11.20  86  N/A  -15.50  .15.50
87  -12.70  *14.20  8a  -16.20  -19.50  *17.10
88  -12.30  -13.00  U  *19.30  -19.80  -18.00
89  -12.00  -12.80  89  -21.00  -23.10  -19.70
90  -12.90  *12.30  90  -21.90  -22.60  -18.80
91  -11.90  -12.10  91,  21.SO  -20.90  -17.90
92  -10.90  N/A  ___22  -20.30  N/A  N/A
_Avg.  *12.36  -12.881  Avg.  -19.98  -21.18
Gross  Investment/GOP  Dome  tc Sav1 sLGDP
Yr  Projected  ActuaL  Yr  Projected  Actual
86  N/A  12.30  86  N/A  3.40
87  17.30  17.70  87  3.50  0.50
88  19.10  18.60  88  3.40  -0.60
89  17.50  18.90  89  3.30  -0.60
90  17.10  18.20  90  1.30  -0.90
*  91  1  17.80  17.40  91  1.10  _  -2.70
92  18.30  N/A  92  1.30  _  N/A
Avg.  17.76  18.16  vg.  2.52  c  -0.86
.,-
Real Export  GNfS  Growth Rate  Real GOP  Growth Rate
Yr  Prolected  ActuaL  Yr  Prolected  Actual
86  N/A  -3.30  86  N/A  0.70
87  7.50  6.40  87  3.10  3.40
S8  7.30  3.40  as  3.80  5.50
89  8.50  1.50  89  4.10  3.70
90  9.20  15.80  90  4.10  2.30
91  13.10  1.70  91  4.50  3.40
92  8.10  N/A  92  4.40  N/A
________9.12  5.76  3.92  3.66101
Budget DgotIcit()/GDP  Current  Account/GDP
Low Income  Countries  Low Income Countries
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-p,*.uu,.  .g, |m  +*Mafl\COUNTRIES  WITH  PER CAPITA  INCOM  IMORE  THAN  N0
aet  DefHt/GOP  Cure  A
Tr  Projected  Actuat  lYr  Projected  Actual  Acit  TOT
86  N/A  ,  9.30  66  N/A  -1T.90  -16.60
s  4.10  . 5.90  ?  -13.40  -15.0_  -14.90
88  . 2.20  - 6.40  88  4.90  -12.80  -15.90
89  - ^  3.40  - 6.90  89  . 8.10  *  9.50  -10.10
90  - 5.60  - 6.10  90  1  10.70  -12.60  -12.20
91  - 3.70  5  5.40  91  - 9.80  -11.10  I  *  8.10
92  . 3.00  N/A  9Z  -11.40  N/A  N/A
Avg.  -3.80  6-61L  -7.42  -12.36
Gross Investment/GDP  Domestifc  Ssvifns  GOP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  ProJected  Actual
86  N/A  20.80  86  N/A  13.30
87  16.40  19.10  87  11.50  13.30
88  18.10  17.70  t8  14.60  13.20
89  16.40  16.10  89  14.10  11.30
90  18.40  17.80  19  14.30  11.00
XX91  tt17.80  15.70  91  13.30  1  t0.20
. 92  18.50  10.40  NAL
Avg.  17.42  17.28  13.56  11.80
Real E_rt  GNPS  Growth  Rate  Resl GOP  Growth Rate
Yr  LActual  Yr  Prolected  Actulot
86  N/A  8.00  86  N/A  3.50
87  7.20  1.90  8T  3.60  2.40
a8  2.70  S.30  88  3.80  5.10
89  6.40  1.40  89  3.80  2.10
90  1.20  2.50  90  3.40  1.40
91  3.80  *2.60  9t  3.20  0.90
92  S.20  N/A  92  3.90  N/A
Avg.  4.26  1.70  Avo.  3.56  2.38103
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Yr  Projected  Actuat  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act TOT
- - _________  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~AdJ.
86  N/A  10.50  86  _  /A  -11.60  .13.20
87  -10.10  10.50  87  -13.10  *11.20  -11.60
U  8.MJ  *  8.50  a  .12.91  -11.00  -10.80
89  - 7.10  - 8.80  89  *11.80  -11.50  - 9.50
90  -7.30  - 8.30  90  -11.00  _  11.20  - 8.70
91  -7.40  - 7.70  91  11.10  -10.10  - 9.40
92  *-6.50  N/A  = 92  -10.50  N/A  N/A
Avg.  =8.08  -8.76  vg.  -11.98  *11.00
Gross Investment/nOP  Domestfc  Sav  _DP
Yr  Prointed  Actual  Yr  ProJ cted  Actual
86  N/A  16.10  86  N/A  7.10
87  16.00  16.00  87  6.40  7.30
8s  16.60  _  17.20  88  6.70  8.60
89  16.30  17.30  89  7.20  8.00
90  17.10  16.70  90  9.00  6.80
9  17.50  15.60  91  8.9f%  7.30
92  19.10  N/A  92 1  9.10  N/A
Avg.  16.70  16.56  7.64  7.60
Real  Export GNFS  Growth Rate  Real  GDP  Growth  Rate
Yr  Prolected  Actual  Yr  Prol cted  Actual
86  N/A  7.30  86  N/A  6.20
8?  6.00  4.20  87  2.10  0.30
.88  1.10  -4.00  88  3.70  3.70
89  7.70  5.00  s9  4.10  3.30
90  7.00  -0.30  90  3.40  2.10
91  7.80  .0.70  91  3.30  2.20
92  6.50  N/A  92  4.40  N/A
5.92  0.84  3.32  2.32
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NON-CA  COUNTRIES
_5udg  t  DefcIt/GDP  _  Current  Account/GDP
Yr  Prolected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act  TOT
_ I  _  .A_j.
86  N/A  t11.30|  86  N/A  *15.00  - 15.70
87  *10.O  - 12.80  87  - 16.80  16.40  16.10
88  - 9.40  12.30  88  -12.40  15.90  - 16.7n
89  - 9.00  - 12.60  89  16.50  _  17.90  - 16.00
90  - 8.60  8.90  90  -17.80  - 18.10  - 15.60
91  - 7.60  8.20  91  -17.10  18.90  - 15.80
92  - 7.50  N/A  92  - 18.20  mlI
Avg.  -9.02  -10.96  Avg. 1  -16.12  -17.44
Gross  Investment/GDP  _  Dostfic  Savi1s/GDP
Yr  Projected  i  Actuat  Yr  Prolected  Actual
86  N/A  15.10  86  N/A  7.50
87  17.30  18.20  87  6.90  5.30
88  19.10  18.30  88  7.60  4.70
89  17.50  =  18.40  89  7.40  3.80
90  17.90  18.30  90  6.70  3.80
91  18.10  17.20  91  6.20  2.50
92  19.00  N/A  92  5.60  N/A
Avg.  17.98  18.08  Avg  6.96  4.02
Real  Ex  ort GNFS  Growth  Rate  Real  GDP  Growth Rate
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Prolected  Actual
86  N/A  2.10  86  N/A  2.10
87  6.90  4.20  87  3.50  3.40
88  5.90  2.90  88  4.00  5.30
89  8.80  3.60  89  4.10  3.70
90  7.10  10.50  90  4.10  2.20
91  9.70  0.80  91  4.30  3.00
92  7.80  N/A  92  4.40  N/A
Avg.  7.68  4.40  _'  *,  4.00  3.52107
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CfA COUNTRIES
Budget  Deficit/MD  ,  Current  Account/GDP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual  Act  TOT
86  N/A  - 9.60  86  N/A  -13.50  -13.10
87  8.50  - 9.30  87  - 8.40  -12.40  -11.60
88  7.00  8.60  88  - 9.50  -12.20  *11.20
89  7.60  - 8.60  89  -11.70  -11.00  - 9.60
90  7.50  - 8.60  90  -11.30  -11.80  -10.10
91  - 6.50  7.30  91  11.40  -10.40  8.70
92  - 5.80  N/A  92  *10.70  N/A  N/A
Avg.  _  7.42  -8.48  Avg.  -10.46  -11.56
Gross  Investm_nt/GDP  Domestic  Savings/GDP
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual
86  N/A  16.30  86  N/A  5.00
87  15.00  15.60  87  4.60  6.30
88  15.40  16.90  88  5.30  7.70
89  15.10  16.20  89  5.80  7.80
90  16.20  15.70  90  6.70  5.60
91  16.60  14.40  91  6.70  5.90
92  17.60  N/A  92  6.40  N/A
Avg.  15.66  15  76  Avg.  5.82  6.66
Real  Export  GNFS  Growth  Rate  ReaL  GDP  Growth  Rate
Yr  Projected  Actual  Yr  Projected  Actual
86  N/A  3.90  86  N/A  5.70
87  7.00  6.00  87  1.20  - 0.90
88  0.10  -2.40  88  3.10  3.70
89  5.20  - 0.30  89  3.80  2.00
90  5.60  0.20  90  2.70  1.70
91  8.20  - 2.20  91  2.60  0.90
92  4.60  N/A  92  4.10  N/A
Avg.  5.22  0.26  Avg.  2.68  1.48109
Budget D0l cIt(-)/GDP  Current Account/GDP
CFA Countries  CFA Countries
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Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1151  Is  Growth  Bad  for  the  Environment?  Charles  van  Mairewijk  July  1993  J. Verbeek
Pollution,  Abatement,  and  Federick  van  der  Ploeg  33935
Endogenous  Growth  Jos Verbeek
WPSI  152 Population,  Health,  and  Nutrition:  Denise  Vaillancourt  July  1993  0. Nadora
Annual  Operational  Review  for Fiscal Stacye  Brown  31091
1992  and  Others
WPS1  153 North  American  Free  Trade  Alberto  Musalem  July  1993  P. Infante
Agreement:  Issues  on  Trade  in  Dimitri  Vittas  37664
Financial  Services  for Mexico  Asli  DemirgOg-Kunt
WPS1  154  Options  for Pension  Reform  in  Tunisia  Dimitri  Vittas  July  1993  P. Infante
37664
WPS1155  The  Regulation  and  Structure  of  Martin  F.  Grace  July  1993  P. Infante
Nonlife  Insurance  in  the  United  Michael  M.  Barth  37664
States
WPSI  156  Tropical  Timber  Trade  Policies:  What  Panayotis  N.  Varangis  July  1993  D. Gustafson
Impact  Will  Eco-Labeling  Have?  Carlos  A.  Primo  Braga  33714
Kenji  Takeuchi
WPS1  157  Intertemporal  and  Interspatial  Sultan  Ahmad  July  1993  E.  O-Reilly-
Comparisons  of  Income:  The  Meaning  Campbell
of Relative  Prices  33707
WPS1158  Population  Growth,  Externalities,  Nancy  Birdsall  July  1993  E. Homsby
and  Poverty  Charles  Griffin  35742
WPS1  159 Stock  Market  Development  and  Asli  Demirg0v.-Kunt  July  1993  P.  Sintim-
Financial  Intermediary  Growth:  Ross  Levine  Aboagye
A Research  Agenda  38526
WPS1  160 Equity  and  Bond  Flows  to  Asia  and  Punam  Chuhan  July  1993  R.  Vo
and  Latin  America:  The  Role  of  Global  Stijn  Claessens  31047
and  Country  Factors  Nlandu  Mamingi
WPS1  161 Increasing  Womens  Participation  in  Molly  Maguire  Teas  July  1993  L.  Maningas
the  Primary  School  Teaching  Force  and  80380
Teacher  Training  in  Nepal
WPS1  162 The  Slovenian  Labor  Market  in  Milan  Vodopivec  July  1993  S. Moussa
Transition:  Issues  and  Lessons  Samo  Hribar-Milic  39019
Learned
WPS1  163  Domestic  Distortions  and  James  E.  Anderson  July  1993  D. Gustafson
International  Trade  J. Peter  Neary  33714Policy Research  Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1  164 Power,  Distortions,  Revolt,  and  Hans  P.  Binswanger  July  1993  H. Binswanger
Reform  in Agricultural  Land  Relations  Klaus  Deininger  31871
Gershon  Feder
WPS1  165 Social  Costs  of  the  Transition  to  Branko  Milanovic  August  1993  R.  Martin
Capitalism:  Poland,  1990-91  39026
WPS1  166  The  Behavior  of  Russian  Firms  in  Simon  Commander  August  1993  0. del  Cid
1992:  Evidence  from  a Survey  Leonid  Liberman  35195
Cecilia  Ugaz
Ruslan  Yemtsov
WPS1  167  Unemployment  and  Labor  Market  Simon  Comrnander  August  1993  0. del  Cid
Dynamics  in Russia  Leonid  Liberman  35195
Ruslan  Yemtsov
WPS1  168 How  Macroeconomic  Projections  Rashid  Faruqee  August  1993  N.Tannan
in Policy  Framework  Papers  for  the  34581
Africa  Region  Compare  with  Outcomes